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Since the inception of democracy in South Africa and the subsequent lifting of sanctions 
and trade embargos placed upon South Africa, the country’s economy has evolved from a 
much protected, inward looking economy into an internationally robust and competitive 
environment. Multinational enterprises (MNE’s) which seek to invest in a geographical 
region often choose certain countries as a base from which they can expand their 
investments to the other countries in the region. With its sizable economy, political stability 
relative to the rest of Africa and overall strength in financial services, South Africa should 
be the ideal location from which foreign investors can extend their investments into the rest 
of Africa (Ogutta, 2011). 
However, in South Africa foreign investment has reduced to an extent where local 
companies are now more invested in international markets than international investment in 
South Africa (Development, 2018). In monetary terms, at the end of 2017, South Africa 
had invested R3.3 trillion in foreign markets while foreign markets had only invested R 1.8 
trillion in South Africa (Development, 2018). 
 
With the current global economic challenges, developing countries like South Africa have 
become increasingly aware of the importance of tax revenue and the effects of base 
erosion and profit shifting on the financial well-being of the state (OECD:G20 Working 
group, 2014); (Economic Commissions for Africa, 2018).  
Section 31 of the South African Income Tax Act, is the main section in the Act relating to 
transfer pricing in South Africa. Transfer pricing is one of the most important issues in 
international tax. It is estimated that more than 60% of international trade happens across 
borders but within the same corporate groups  (Cobnam & Mcnair, n.d.). The transfer 
pricing rules of South Africa are closely aligned with the wording of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations (UN) Model Tax 
conventions and are in line with tax treaties and other international tax principals (SARS, 
2010). 
The cornerstone of the transfer pricing model is the use of the arm’s length price.  In terms 
of the arm’s length principle, in order to test the reasonability of  pricing within MNE’s, tax 
authorities should use a similar but unrelated open market transaction as the benchmark 
to determine if there were any profit shifting to avoid tax by the  MNE’s between their 
different establishments in the different tax jurisdictions. 
The biggest challenge in South Africa and other countries, when applying the arm’s length 
principle is the lack of local comparable data available to evaluate the transfer prices 
(intercompany transactions) within the MNE’s (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2018). 
There is a lack of publicly available company financial data that may be used to calculate 
comparative benchmarks, and the information which is available, is not necessarily 
sufficient or adequate for comparability purposes (Tax Justice Network, 2013). Information 
which is accessible may be incomplete and difficult to interpret. In other cases information 
may be difficult to obtain for reasons of its geographical location and, in some instances, it 
may simply not be possible to obtain information from independent enterprises due to 
enterprise competitiveness and confidentiality concerns (OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 2018). Despite all of these limiting factors, the arm’s length principle, as 
recommended by the OECD & UN Tax Model, remains the globally accepted guiding 
principle for calculating acceptable transfer prices. This is evident in the fact that almost all 
bilateral treaties in the world are based on these tax models (Steenkamp, 2017). 
 For the last decade in South Africa, corporate tax has been the third largest contributor 
toward total revenue collection by National Treasury  (National Treasury, 2017). It is 
therefore important that domestic tax laws should be able to protect the country’s tax base 
through legislation that discourages base erosion and profit shifting.  
The objective of this dissertation is to consider whether South Africa should continue to 
exclusively apply the arm’s length principle, which relies on comparable data, when 
determining transfer prices for goods in MNE’s. In testing this position, the following two 
alternative methods namely, formulary apportionment and predetermined margins, will be 
considered to evaluate whether or not these additional or complementary methods should 
be applied in the determination of arm’s length where comparable data is not available or 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS and TERMS 
BEPS : Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
 
OECD : The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
 
MNE:  Multinational enterprise (MNE) 
 
UN:   United Nations  
 
Transfer pricing: a term used to describe arrangements involving the transfer of goods or 
services, at an artificial price, in order to transfer income or expenses from one enterprise 
to an associated enterprise in a different tax jurisdiction. This result in the income derived 
at for each enterprise being disproportionate to their relative economic contributions, and 
thus impacting the relevant tax jurisdictions’ fair share of tax. 
 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS): Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) is a 
technical term referring to the negative effect of multinational companies' tax avoidance 
strategies on national tax bases. BEPS can be achieved through the use of transfer 
pricing, or, more correctly, "transfer mispricing". 
 
Advance pricing Arrangement (APA): An arrangement that determines, in advance of 
controlled transactions, an appropriate set of criteria (e.g. method, comparables and 
appropriate adjustments thereto, critical assumptions as to future events) for the 
determination of the transfer pricing for those transactions over a fixed period of time.  An 
advance pricing arrangement may be unilateral (involving one tax administration and a 
taxpayer) or multilateral (involving the agreement of two or more tax administrations). 
 
Controlled transaction: A transaction in terms of which the ownership or control 
relationship is able to influence the transfer price set. In relation to section 31 of the South 
African Income Tax Act, a controlled transaction will be any transaction between 
connected persons, as defined in section 1 of the Act. 
 
Uncontrolled transaction: A transaction which is concluded at arm’s length between 
enterprises that are not connected persons in relation to each other. This could, for 
example, include transactions at arm’s length between a member of a multinational and an 
unconnected person. Uncontrolled transactions form the benchmark against which a 
multinational’s transfer pricing is appraised in determining whether its prices are arm’s 
length. 
 
Multinational: The term multinational is used to refer to any group of connected persons 
with members or business activities in more than one country. The term “members” refers 
to constituent parts (including natural persons) of that multinational, each having a 
separate legal existence. 
 
Multinational enterprise (MNE): is a company that has a worldwide approach to markets 
and production or one with operations in several countries. 
 
OECD Guidelines: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Report on Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administration published in July 1995 and supplemented with additional chapters and 
revisions to the contents thereof. 
 
Safe harbours: Where tax authorities give general guidelines on the interpretation of tax 
laws, these may state that transactions falling within a certain range will be accepted by 
the tax authorities without further questions. 
 
Associated enterprises: Generally speaking, enterprises are associated where the same 
persons participate directly or independently in the management, control or capital of both 
enterprises, i.e. both enterprises are under common control. 
 
Independent enterprises: Two enterprises are independent enterprises with respect to 
each other if they are not associated enterprises with respect to each other. 
 
Comparability Analysis: Comparison of controlled transaction conditions with conditions 
prevailing in transactions between independent enterprises (uncontrolled transactions). 
Controlled and uncontrolled transactions are comparable if none of the differences 
between the transactions could materially affect the factor being examined in the 
methodology (e.g. price or margin), or if reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to 
eliminate the material effects of any such differences. 
 
Tax Haven/ Low tax jurisdiction: Tax haven in the "classical" sense refers to a country 
which imposes a low or no tax, and is used by corporations to avoid tax which otherwise 







CHAPTER 1   INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Since the inception of democracy in South Africa and the subsequent lifting of sanctions 
and trade embargos placed upon South Africa, the country’s economy has evolved from 
a much protected, inward looking economy into an internationally robust and 
competitive environment. According to the secretary-general of the UN Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), South Africa is home to more than 75% of the top 
global companies in Africa and has the oldest and most developed market economy in 
the whole of Africa (Musau, 2017). Multinational enterprises which seek to invest in a 
geographical region often choose certain countries as a base from which they can 
expand their investments to the other countries in the region. South Africa is the second 
largest economy in Africa with a GDP of $ 349.3 billion.1 With its 'sizable economy, 
political stability relative to the rest of Africa and overall strength in financial services, 
South Africa should be the ideal location from which foreign investors can extend their 
investments into the rest of Africa (Ogutta, 2011).  
However, in South Africa foreign investment has reduced to an extent where local 
companies are now more invested in international markets than international investment 
in South Africa (Development, 2018). In monetary terms, at the end of 2017, South 
Africa had invested R3.3 trillion in foreign markets while foreign markets had only 
invested R 1.8 trillion in South Africa (Development, 2018). The leadership of South 
Africa, beginning with the National Executive Committee needs to address the political 
and socio-economic challenges in the country in order to grow investor confidence and 
remain an economically feasible option for foreign investors. In addressing these 
challenges, the economic policies and tax legislative changes that could potentially be 
implemented should also be responsive to the stimulation and growth of the local 
economy.  With the current global economic challenges, developing countries like South 
Africa are increasingly aware of the importance of tax revenue and the effects of base 
erosion and profit shifting on the financial well-being of the state (OECD:G20 Working 
group, 2014); (Economic Commissions for Africa, 2018). In South Africa, where 
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corporate tax has been the third largest contributor toward total revenue collection by 
National Treasury for the last decade (National Treasury, 2017) it is important that 
domestic tax laws should be able to protect the country’s tax base through legislation 
that discourages base erosion and profit shifting. 
Section 31 of the South African Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (‘the ITA’) relates to transfer 
pricing. 
Transfer pricing is one of the most important issues in international tax (Cobnam & 
Mcnair, n.d.). It is estimated that more than 60% of international trade happens across 
borders but within the same corporate groups.2 Intragroup cross border transactions 
recorded at transfer prices not reflective of an arm’s length price have been identified as 
a tool with which Multinational Enterprises (MNE’s) are able to shift profits between 
different jurisdictions (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2018). The OECD Glossary of 
terms defines transfer pricing as follows: 
“A transfer price is a price, adopted for book- keeping purposes, which is used to   
value transactions between affiliated enterprises integrated under the same 
management at artificially high or low levels in order to effect an unspecified 
income payment or capital transfer between those enterprises” (OECD, 2003) 
Section 31 of the ITA was amended in 2012.  In terms of the amendment, the discretion 
and duty to adjust transfer prices to reflect an arm’s length price is not the onus of the 
Commissioner. This responsibility has been transferred to the taxpayer. It is expected 
that the taxpayer should determine and document transfer prices reflective of an arm’s 
length transaction (Ratombo & Blumenthal, 2017). In terms of the amended s 31, the 
onus lies with the taxpayer to make a transfer pricing adjustment in determining the 
taxable income, when a cross border transaction is entered into between a South 
African taxpayers and another tax payer who are connected persons in relation to each 
other. The adjustment is only required if one of these transacting  parties receives a tax 
benefit as a result of any terms or conditions in the  transaction which is different to that 
which would have existed had those persons not been connected persons and dealing 
at arm’s length. (SAIT, 2016). The application of the arm’s length principle grants local 
tax authorities the ability to compare an intercompany cross- border transaction to a 
similar transaction by an independent enterprise in the open market. This comparison 
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will reflect if the price charged by the MNE in the intercompany transaction is indeed a 
reasonable price that would have been charged had it been entered into by independent 
enterprises (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2018). 
The biggest challenge in South Africa and elsewhere, when applying the arm’s length 
principle is the lack of local comparable data available to evaluate the transfer prices 
(intercompany transactions) within the MNE’s (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
2018). Comparable data, which is the core requirement in determining an arm’s length 
price, is very limited for developing economies. This lack of publicly available company 
financial data that may be used to calculate comparative benchmarks, and the 
information which is available, is not necessarily sufficient or adequate for comparability 
purposes (Tax Justice Network, 2013). Information which is accessible may be 
incomplete and difficult to interpret. In other cases information may be difficult to obtain 
for reasons of its geographical location and, in some instances, it may simply not be 
possible to obtain information from independent enterprises due to enterprise 
competitiveness and confidentiality concerns. In some cases, the information could 
simply not exist, or there may be no comparable independent enterprises from which to 
source the information (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2018).  
European and American databases are used by some developing countries as a source 
for comparable data in order to determine the appropriate transfer prices for certain 
transactions. A challenge when developing countries use developed countries’ 
databases as a source for comparable is that problems may arise due to significant 
differences such as geographical locations and market conditions (Mcnair, et al., 2017). 
These differences could render the available data unsuitable for the specific transaction 
pricing as the market and environmental conditions would not necessarily be 
comparable to the environment in which the MNE operates in the developing country. 
Despite all of these limiting factors, the arm’s length principle remains the generally 
accepted guiding principle in establishing an acceptable transfer price. This is 
evidenced through the wording of Article 9 of both the UN and OECD Tax Model 
treaties which underpins the incorporation of the arm’s length principle (OECD Centre 







1.2 Objectives and rationale of the research 
The objective of this dissertation is to consider whether South Africa should continue to 
exclusively apply the arm’s length principle, which relies on comparable data, when 
determining transfer prices for MNE’s. In testing this position, the following two 
alternative methods namely, formulary apportionment and predetermined margins, will 
be considered to evaluate whether or not these additional or complementary methods 
should be applied in the determination of arm’s length where comparable data is not 
available or requires significant adjustment. 
To achieve this objective, this dissertation will address the following: 
 the influence of the OECD transfer pricing regulations on the South African 
transfer pricing policies, 
 the transfer pricing legislation in South Africa, namely s31. 
 the formulary apportionment method. 
 the use predetermined margins, as used in Brazil, as a basis of establishing 
transfer prices for goods. 
 
1.3 Limitation of scope  
This dissertation is not intended to propose tax legislative changes. It only intends to 
identify existing challenges with the current legislation and provide alternative 
approaches in the form of supplementary transfer pricing methods that could potentially 
form part of a guidance document for transfer pricing of goods only. This guidance 
document, with the support of a binding general rule could become generally prevailing 
practice for the Tax Administration Act. Whilst economic and political factors will be 
considered in discussion on the overall investment/ trade climate in South Africa, these 
factors will not be analysed in detail as they are included as background and go beyond 
the scope of this study. 
1.4 Structure of dissertation and research method 
This paper will consist of the following chapters:   




This chapter will serve as an introduction to the South African landscape as it relates to 
MNE’s and the treatment of cross border transactions within a group. It will look at the 
OECD model, its influence on the international tax practices established in South Africa 
as well as the changes brought about by the BEPS action plans and the 
recommendations made by the Davis Committee in South Africa. This chapter will look 
at the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the arm’s length principle, and the 
problems faced by, and actions taken by other developing countries that might be facing 
the same global challenges. 
 CHAPTER 3: Formulary apportionment  
This chapter will introduce formulary apportionment and the noted advantages and 
disadvantages that exist when implementing the method. This chapter will refer to 
academic papers and recognised tax journals to assess whether formulary 
apportionment could be a reasonable and reliable replacement of the arm’s length 
principle, at least in selected circumstances. It will also look at the differences between 
formulary apportionment and the arm’s length principle.  
 CHAPTER 4: Brazil – can predetermined margins be a solution to the South 
African problem?  
This chapter will look at the transfer pricing methods implemented in Brazil. Brazil’s tax 
administration and the legislation have been considered by some as radical in its 
approach to transfer pricing. Transfer pricing rules were introduced in Brazil in 1996 
through the enactment of Law 9,430 (Valadao, 2013). These rules were modelled on 
the OECD practices, but it differed in the most fundamental way. The Brazilian method 
or also known as the Sixth Method3 does not base the transfer price of goods on the 
arm’s length principle and it is applied specifically to commodities In terms of the 
Brazilian method the transfer price is based on predetermined margins (The United 
Nations, 2017, p. 528). This chapter will address the differences as well as the 
similarities between predetermined margins as implemented in Brazil, the arm’s length 
principle and also any synergies with formulary apportionment.  
 CHAPTER 5: Conclusion: A solution for South Africa 
After reviewing the current transfer pricing legislation in South Africa and the alternative 
methods available as discussed in earlier chapters, this chapter will seek to determine if 
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any of these methods would be better than, alternative; or, complementary to the 
current arm’s length principle. An alternative method may be justified if it would provide 
a price more reflective of the economic substance of the transaction than the arm’s 




CHAPTER 2: STATUS QUO OF TRANSFER PRICING IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
2.1 Influence of the OECD on South African Transfer pricing policy 
2.1.1 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an 
intergovernmental organisation with 36 member countries where the governments of 
these countries work together to promote economic growth, prosperity and sustainable 
development on a global scale (OECD, 2018a). 
The OECD provides a platform where its member country governments can compare 
policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify good practice and 
coordinate domestic and international policies in order to support sustainable economic 
growth. The organisation also seeks to boost employment, raise the standard of living, 
maintain financial stability, assist other countries’ economic development and contribute 
to growth in world trade. In collaboration with its official partners, the OECD is involved 
in the establishment and setting of international standards on matters ranging from the 
safety of chemicals to tax and even agriculture. The organisation has a number of 
official partners, such as The World Bank, African Development Bank, The World Health 
Organisation, and a number of United Nations Organisations (OECD, 2018b). 
South Africa is not a member of the OECD but it has observer status and as such is a 
participant and regularly provides input at various working party meetings within the 
organisation. In May 2007 the co-operation between the OECD and South Africa, along 
with other emerging economies was strengthened via the “Enhanced Engagement 
programme.”4 South Africa is regarded as a key partner5 even though full membership 
status to the organisation has not been granted. It is expected of the key partners to 
contribute to the OECD‘s work in a comprehensive and sustained manner (OECD, 
2014). 
The OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations, which was last updated in 2018, provides member countries and non-
member countries with a guide on how to address the allocation of profits between 
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multinational enterprises when it comes to cross border activities and the setting of 
transfer prices.  
The cornerstone of the OECD transfer pricing model is the use of the arm’s length price. 
Paragraph 1 of Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention6 (OECD MTC) gives 
authority to the use of the arm’s length price. “The primary purpose of Article 9(1) is to 
ensure that the domestic rules comply with the arm’s length principle in respect of transactions 
regarding business income between associated enterprises with the objective of mitigating 
economic double taxation. Article 9(1) permits the contracting states to adjust profits in line with 
the arm’s length principle, which can be undertaken by imputing income or reducing expenses 
according to the provisions of national tax law.” (Solilová & Steindl, 2013). 
Article 9 forms the basis of bilateral tax treaties of OECD member countries and non-
member countries (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2018). The arm’s length principle 
is based on the ability to compare a controlled transaction entered into by an MNE with 
that of an uncontrolled independent enterprise and determining if the conditions that 
have arisen in the controlled transaction would have existed if the same transaction was 
entered into by independent uncontrolled enterprises (OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, 2018). OECD member and non-OECD member countries, like South Africa, 
frequently express concerns about the lack of availability and quality of financial data on 
transactions between unrelated parties that can be used to make the relevant 
comparison (OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 2018). This shortcoming creates an 
environment that enables MNE’s to set transfer prices that cannot be compared and 
evaluated adequately, which could eventually result in fiscal loss to the tax authorities of 
the country in which the MNE’s operate. 
 
2.1.2 Current legislation on transfer pricing in South Africa 
In the 2010 South African Budget Speech, then Finance Minister of South Africa, Mr 
Pravin Gordhan announced that corrective action would be taken against taxpayers 
making use of complicated tax avoidance arrangements and the use of transfer pricing 
and cross-border mismatches (Budget, 2010). This was indicative of the fact that the 
South African National Treasury had become increasingly aware of the misuse of the 
transfer pricing legislation by multinational enterprises to move profits to lower tax 
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jurisdictions and in so doing eroding the collections by National Treasury. The finance 
minister’s statement in the 2010 budget speech regarding this matter was followed by 
the introduction of the redrafting of s31 through the Taxation Laws Amendments Bill and 
the Taxation Law Amendments Act of 2011. 7 Section 31 of the South African Income 
Tax Act, is the main section in the Act relating to transfer pricing in South Africa. The 
aim of the redrafting of s31 and the accompanying practice notes was to align the South 
African transfer pricing rules with the international best practices as determined by the 
OECD and UN model tax conventions and bring the South African approach closer to 
the guides as issued by the OECD (SARS, 2010).  
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Taxation Laws Amendment Bill, 2010 provided 
the following reasons for the modernisation of the South Africa Transfer Pricing rules 
(SARS, 2010). 
 “The wording of the old section 31 focused on separate transactions, as opposed to 
overall arrangements driven by an overarching profit objective. 
 This narrow focus gave rise to artificial arguments by certain taxpayers seeking an 
excessive emphasis on the literal terms of the transactions, as opposed to a focus 
on the overall economic substance and commercial objective of the arrangement. 
 The language of the old section unduly emphasised the comparable uncontrolled 
price (CUP) method over other transfer pricing methodologies, which may in fact be 
more reliable under particular circumstances; and 
 The emphasis on price as opposed to profits did not neatly align with wording 
contained in tax treaties, potentially creating difficulties in the mutual agreement 
procedures available under tax treaties”  (SARS, 2010). 
The new transfer pricing rules for South Africa commenced in April 2012, with the new 
laws applying to years of assessment commencing on or after that date. In the National 
Treasury’s Explanatory memorandum it was stated that, 
“the new transfer pricing rules are closely aligned with the wording of the OECD and UN 
Model Tax conventions and are in line with tax treaties and other international tax 
principals. South Africa will continue to follow the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
closely both with respect to transfer pricing in general and the power to re-characterise 
transactions in the application of the transfer pricing rules” (SARS, 2010).  
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The success of the OECD and UN model tax conventions is demonstrated in the fact 
that almost all bilateral treaties in the world are based on them with the third most 
prominent Model being the US Tax Model (Steenkamp, 2017). “Their (OECD & UN Tax 
Models) wide acceptance and the standardisation of many international tax rules have been 
important factors in reducing international double taxation" (Arnold, 2015). The South African 
National Treasury understands that as a developing country with an emerging economy, 
South Africa’s tax treaties with other countries are an important tool to encourage 
foreign investment and trade.  
South Africa is a party to a number of tax treaties with developed countries within the 
OECD, neighbouring countries across the African continent and other developing 
countries. For this reason the general need to preserve South Africa’s international 
competitiveness by creating a tax environment conducive to economic growth should 
always be a factor to consider when implementing fiscal policies and tax laws (NCOP 
Finance, 2015). As per the SARS website, as at 12 February 2018, South Africa has 
entered into 85 bilateral treaties (SARS, 2018).  
 
2.2   Challenges faced by developing countries.  
The majority of bilateral treaties in the world are based on the OECD and UN tax model 
convention. This majority also includes developing countries as the governments of 
these countries considers compliance with these international principles an integral part 
of remaining marketable and relevant in the global economy (Mcnair, et al., 2017).  
The arm’s length approach to pricing cross border intercompany transactions is simply 
regarded as a principle of international tax law by the OECD, even though it is regarded 
and implemented as anti-avoidance and anti- tax evasion measures in the domestic tax 
law of various countries (United Nations, 2012). Therefore even as a non-member 
country of the OECD, South Africa like many other emerging and developed countries 
have adopted the international tax guidance per the OECD model tax convention into its 
domestic tax laws. The listed OECD member countries include the world’s most 
advanced and influential economies. Of the 36 member countries, 27 of these countries 
are listed as developed countries as per the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2017). 
These member countries are also the countries in which many of the large multinational 
corporations currently benefiting from the economic imbalance that can be created 
through the existing architecture of the arm’s length principle are resident (Cobnam, 




developed by the OECD would be done with the best interest of its members and not 
necessarily considering the impact the policies would have on developing and other 
non-member countries.  
The United Nations Committee of Experts on International Cooperation8 in Tax Matters 
represents one of very few multilateral forums where the members of the committee can 
engage in international tax cooperation, and carry out their duties as mandated. The 
member, as selected by the Secretary General in consultation with member states of 
the OECD is meant to represent an equitable geographical distribution and be 
representative of different tax systems. Given the duties that the committee is mandated 
with, the members should be selected from the fields of tax policy and tax 
administration. The committee consists of 25 members nominated by governments but 
acting in their own personal capacity. The current members’ term is due to expire in 
2021 ( UN Economic and Social council, 2018).  
The lack of skills, and resources in developing countries were identified as the reasons 
why tax administrators fail to identify transfer pricing mechanisms in MNE’s operating in 
their tax jurisdictions. This enables MNE’s to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions without 
much challenge from the tax authorities (Mcnair, et al., 2017). 
Developing countries are usually characterised by general poverty, low income per 
capita, poor health services, underdeveloped infrastructure and poor standard of 
education for the majority of the population (Thapa, 2010). These countries are often 
rich in natural resources, which are underexplored, and a human capital base that could 
generally be employed at a lower per capita cost (Thapa, 2010). This makes these 
countries good destinations for MNE’s to establish their operations, keeping production 
costs low.  
The establishment of MNE’s are welcomed by the governments of these developing 
nations as their presence should create the opportunity to stimulate and grow the local 
economy of the country. However, the existing international tax laws and policies, as it 
relates to cross border transactions and transfer pricing, appears to create a challenge 
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 The Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters as a subsidiary body of the Economic and 
Social Council is responsible for keeping under review and update, as necessary, the United Nations Model Double 
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries and the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral 
Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries. It also provides a framework for dialogue with a view 
to enhancing and promoting international tax cooperation among national tax authorities and assesses how new 




for the tax administrators in these countries. Instead of reaping the benefit of collecting 
tax revenue from these MNE’s for the use of its resources, these poorly resourced tax 
administrators have to accept profit shifting by MNE’s operating in the country to lower 
tax jurisdictions (Ogutta, 2016). With inadequate resources and a lack of available, 
relevant, reliable information for comparative purposes, complex cross border 
transactions go unchallenged by these tax administrators. In some instances, due to the 
complexity or uniqueness of some of these transactions, there is simply no comparable 
information available to be used for a comparability analysis (Ogutta, 2016). 
The challenges encountered with transfer pricing and cross border transactions is not 
limited to developing countries. Developed countries experience the same frustrations. 
The economic impact from these tax avoidance schemes and profit shifting by MNE’s 
tends to be greater for developing countries as they are more heavily reliant on the 
contribution of corporate taxes to their respective national treasuries (OECD, 2012). The 
United Nations Practical Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries (2012) was 
written as a response to the need, often expressed by developing countries, for clearer 
guidance on the policy and administrative aspects in applying transfer pricing analysis 
(United Nations, 2012). In paragraph 1.10.6, this manual describes specific challenges 
for developing countries as follows:  
“It is often in practice extremely difficult, especially in some developing countries, to 
obtain adequate information to apply the arm’s length principle for the following 
reasons:  
(a) In developing countries there tend to be fewer organised players in any given 
sector than in developed countries and finding proper comparable data can be 
very difficult; 
(b) In developing countries the comparable information may be incomplete and in a 
form which is difficult to analyse because the resources and processes are not 
available. In the worst case, information about an independent enterprise may 
simply not exist. Databases relied on in transfer pricing analysis tend to focus on 
developed country data that may not be relevant to developing country markets 
(at least without resource and information‐intensive adjustments), and in any 
event are usually very costly to access; and  
(c) In many developing countries whose economies have just opened up or are in 




existence in many of the sectors and areas are therefore still unexploited or 
unexplored; in such cases there would be an inevitable lack of comparables”.  
Unfortunately, short of highlighting the challenges faced in the developing countries, the 
guide did not go very far in guiding or equipping these developing countries on how to 
effectively overcome any of the very real challenges faced in applying the practice of the 
arm’s length principle. In 2014, the OECD released the “Transfer Pricing Comparability 
Data and Developing Countries Report [2014]”. This document was developed by the 
OECD as a response to concerns about the lack of availability and the poor quality of 
comparable financial data to which developing countries have access when it comes to 
transfer pricing. 
The document focused on four alternative approaches to addressing the concerns 
regarding availability, reliability and relevance of information that could be used by 
developing countries in determining transfer prices.   
The four approaches discussed were namely: 
 Expanding access to data sources for comparable data; 
 More effective use of comparable data sources for and guidance on making      
adjustments; 
 Approaches to reducing reliance on directly comparable data, 
 Advance pricing agreements and mutual agreement proceedings. 
At the end of the report the four approaches listed above were summarised and 
possible actions to try and achieve each approach was summarised in the report. 
A number of responses by monitoring groups were critical of this OECD report and the 
proposed guidelines contained in it. The Tax Justice Network9 submitted their response 
to the OECD on the report as follows: 
 “In our view, the Report is disappointing. It is inadequate and unhelpful for developing 
countries. The Report: 
 assumes that developing countries should use transfer pricing methodologies 
which have been found deficient even by OECD countries, and are currently being 
revised, especially through the project on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS); 
 prioritizes the use of comparables, although these methods have been shown to 
be deficient in both theory and practice, especially for developing countries; 
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analysis and advocacy on international tax; on the international aspects of financial regulation; on the role of tax in society; and 
on the impacts of tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax 'competition' and tax havens. It seeks to create understanding and debate, 





 obscures the real problem, which is not the absence of data but lack of appropriate 
comparables, due to the integrated nature of multinational firms; 
 fails to provide any information about what databases are available, or an evaluation 
of whether or how the data that they provide is supposed to be helpful for the 
purposes of auditing transfer pricing; 
 encourages developing countries to use methods which are likely to require case-by-
case negotiation to ameliorate the fundamental deficiency of data without 
acknowledging the asymmetries of knowledge and power between developing 
country tax administrations and both tax advisers and developed country tax 
administrations; and 
 Provide only a superficial consideration of alternatives to the use of comparables. 
 In our view methods based on either comparable prices or comparable profits are 
unsuitable for developing countries, and likely to lead to either over- or under-
taxation, because: 
 the lack of appropriate comparable means that appropriate assessments 
require detailed examinations, specialist knowledge, and subjective 
judgment; 
   such assessments are time-consuming, and require skilled specialists, who 
developing countries find it hard to recruit and retain; 
 the subjective judgments involved leave officials open to undue pressures 
and temptations to corruption. 
    “Our recommendations are that developing countries should: 
 learn from the mistakes of the OECD countries, and build on their own experience, 
for example the `sixth method’, or the Brazilian approach; 
 anticipate rather than await reforms likely to result from initiatives to combat BEPS, 
such as country-by-country reporting; 
 establish methods which are clear, transparent and easy to administer without the 
need for significant ad hoc investigation or subjective judgment” 
2.3 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) 
“The BEPS project came about as an attempt by the world’s major and emerging 
economies to update the tax rules on corporate taxation, and address the perception 
that global MNE’s are not paying their fair share of taxes in today’s global economy 
(Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016).” 
Base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) refers to tax avoidance strategies that exploit 
gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax locations 




not a negative element in international tax. It is the underlying arms’ length pricing 
model that has become a tool of pricing manipulation and profit shifting in a growing 
number of incidents (Beebeejaun, 2018). South Africa, like many other countries, be 
they developed or developing are facing a number of practical challenges when it 
comes to transfer pricing and the determining of an arm’s length price for comparability 
purposes as required in terms of the OECD guidelines.   
On 19 March 2014 in an article written by Amanda Visser for BD Live she stated that 
studies undertaken have showed that MNE’s were shifting profits of approximately 
$365bn a year from developing countries to developed countries through the use of 
transfer pricing mechanisms. In her article she said that South Africa had billions of rand 
leaving the country in the form of royalties, intellectual property payments as well as 
management & service fees. The global economic crises had highlighted, especially to 
developing countries the importance of tax revenue and the negative impact it has on 
the sovereignty of a state when tax revenue is lost through base erosion and profit 
shifting to low tax jurisdictions. The article also referred to a consultative conference of 
the African Tax Administration forum that was held to the end of 2012 to discuss the 
importance and participation of Africa in the development of new rules and methods to 
prevent base erosion and profit shifting. In the same article the impact and the negative 
effect of base erosion was also highlighted by Sunita Manik, head of SARS’s Large 
Business Centre  (Visser, 2014). “Ms Manik told delegates from 29 African countries and 
representatives of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that 
some multinational companies in certain sectors had an effective tax rate of 3%-5%, while the 
average for the rest of the sector was 11%. The OECD head of global relations Richard Parry 
said international tax rules were more than 100 years old. The global economic crisis had made 
governments step back and revisit their sustainability. Lee Corrick, special adviser to the OECD 
on transfer pricing, said the challenge facing Africa was a lack of appropriate legislation for tax 
administrators to deal with base erosion and profit shifting (Visser, 2014)”. 
 It is understandable that South Africa needs to maintain transfer pricing laws that will 
continue to attract multinationals to operate within its borders, but this should not be 
done at the loss of the country’s tax revenue in these cross border transactions. South 
Africa’s tax administration is not alone in their challenge of addressing BEPS 
(Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2014). Tax administrators in many countries have 
experienced that BEPS is difficult to regulate by way of unilateral actions and that a 




concern, in June 2012 the G20 world leaders called for action to be taken by the OECD 
to reform the international tax system (BEPS Sub- Commitee, 2014).  
 
In February 2013, the OECD released a Report entitled “Addressing Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting” (BEPS) in which it is noted that BEPS constitute a serious risk to tax 
revenues, tax sovereignty and tax fairness for OECD member countries and non-
members alike. This report was followed by the release of a 15 item Action Plan of the 
OECD in July 2013 (BEPS Sub- Commitee, 2014).The 15 separate Actions Plans each 
identified weaknesses and challenges within a particular area of the international tax 
law.  Action plans of interest, as it relates to transfer pricing is Action plans 8 – 10 
focusing on the alignment of transfer pricing with value creation and Action plan 13 
focusing on transfer pricing documentation. 
The BEPS Action Plan was established by the OECD to try and address issues and 
flaws in international tax rules on a multinational basis. The BEPS project was endorsed 
by the G20 leaders and their finance ministers at their G20 summit held in St 
Petersburg in September of 2013. The Tax Annexure to the St Petersburg Declaration 
stated the following mandate for the BEPS project: 
 “First, changes to international tax rules must be designed to address the gaps between 
different countries’ tax systems, while still respecting the sovereignty of each country to 
design its own rules. 
 Second, the existing international tax rules on tax treaties, permanent establishment, 
and transfer pricing will be examined to ensure that profits are taxed where economic 
activities occur and value is created. 
 Third, more transparency will be established, including through a common template for 
companies to report to tax administrations on their worldwide allocation of profits and 
tax. 
 Fourth, all the actions are expected to be delivered in the coming 18 to 24 months. 
Developing countries must reap the benefits of the G20 tax agenda (Russia G20, 2013).” 
 
In the 2013 Budget speech, the South African Minister of Finance announced that a tax 
review committee would be established. On 17 July 2013 the Davis Tax Committee 
(DTC) was appointed. The committee was instructed to  investigate the role of South 
Africa’s tax system “ in the promotion of inclusive economic growth, employment 




From an international perspective, the DTC was mandated to attend to the concerns 
about base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), particularly as it relates to company 
income tax, as identified by the OECD and G20. The DTC set up a BEPS Sub-
committee to deal with the matters addressed in the OECD BEPS Action Plans (BEPS 
Sub- Commitee, 2014). In order to get input from industry on how BEPS should be 
addressed within the South African context the DTC BEPS Sub-committee met with 
different stakeholders ranging from business representatives, the trade unions, civil 
society organisations, tax practitioners, SARS, National Treasury, the South African 
Reserve Bank, members of international bodies and academics (BEPS Sub- Commitee, 
2014). 
 
2.4    Final OECD BEPS Reports 
The Final BEPS report was the centre of much discussion and criticism by monitoring 
groups and social activist groups. The BEPS Reports were expected to bring about the 
biggest changes to multinational taxation since building blocks of the current framework 
were introduced in the 1920s (Economist, 2015) .However promoters who oppose 
corporate-tax avoidance have stated  that BEPS is at  best a partial success. It is a first 
step towards something more substantial (Cobham, 2015 (b)). In a 2015 online article 
published in the Economist the writer states on the OECD BEPS Action Plans:  
“The biggest disappointment is that, in opting to renovate the existing system, the OECD 
has stuck with its most deeply flawed pillar: the “independent entity” principle. This rests 
on the fictitious assumption that the various parent and subsidiary companies in a 
corporate group act like separate legal persons that transact with each other at arm’s 
length (Economist, 2015).” 
The process, which had been compressed into a 24-month period, was hindered from 
the beginning. Consensus could not be reached by all the parties involved on how to 
proceed with the radical overhaul of the international tax laws that was needed to keep 
international tax laws relevant and relatable to the global economy in which it was being 
applied. This resulted in a patch-up job offering improvements in certain areas but also 
failing to deal with the core problems (Economist, 2015). 
In October 2015, the OECD released their final BEPS Action Plan report. The 
overarching intention of the OECD BEPS plans were to bring the location of taxable 
profits in line with the location of economic activities and value creation, and improve 






Action Plan 8 – 10: The alignment of transfer pricing with value creation 
The work on transfer pricing under the BEPS Action Plan focused on three key areas: 
 Action 8 dealt with transfer pricing matters that addressed transactions involving 
intangibles. This was motivated by the fact that profits generated through 
valuable intangibles were being misallocated and adding to the problem of base 
erosion and profit shifting.   (OECD BEPS Reports, 2015). 
 Action 9 looked at the relationship that exist between the allocation of risk 
between contracting parties and the associated split of profits in relation to those 
risks, which do not necessarily correlate to the activities actually carried out. The 
action plan also considered the relationship that existed between the funding 
provided by capital rich MNE group members  and the  level of returns allocated 
to these funding MNE’s which was not reflective  of the level of activity 
undertaken by the particular  MNE group member. (OECD BEPS Reports, 2015). 
 Action 10 focused on other high-risk areas, including the scope for addressing profit 
allocations resulting from transactions which are not commercially rational for the 
individual enterprises concerned (re-characterisation). It also discussed the scope for 
targeting the use of transfer pricing methods in a way which results in diverting profits 
from the most economically important activities of the MNE group, and neutralising the 
use of certain types of payments between members of the MNE group (such as 
management fees and head office expenses) to erode the tax base in the absence of 
alignment with value creation (OECD BEPS Reports, 2015). 
The revised OECD Transfer pricing guide was issued in July of 2017. What is 
emphasised in the document for the reader to appreciate is that the intended outcome 
of Action plans 8 -10 can only be reached if: 
 A clear understanding of the substance of the actual transaction between the 
associated parties can be established.  
 This will be achieved by analysing the contractual relation between the parties in 
combination with the behaviour of the parties.  
The common outcome to the revisions in Action 8 -10 is that the actual conduct (what is 
actually done) will supplement or replace the contractual arrangements (what is said to 





This combined with the proper application of pricing methods in a way that prevents the 
allocation of profits to locations where no contributions are made to these profits, will 
lead to the allocation of profits to the enterprises that conduct the corresponding 
business activities. In circumstances where the transaction between associated 
enterprises lacks commercial substance, the guidance continues to authorise the 
disregarding of the arrangement for transfer pricing purposes (OECD BEPS Reports, 
2015). 
The revised guidance for transfer pricing includes two important clarifications relating to 
risks and intangibles.  
  
 The OECD report stated that the where a party assumes a particular contractual 
level of risk, and it does not have the financial capability or available resources to 
exercise meaningful control over the risk, the risk and related profit will be 
allocated to the party within the group that actually has the resources available to 
control the risk (OECD BEPS Reports, 2015). 
 
 As it relates to intangibles, the guidance clarifies that legal ownership alone does 
not necessarily generate a right to all or even any of the return that is generated 
by the use of the intangible (OECD BEPS Reports, 2015). 
“The group companies performing important functions, controlling economically 
significant risks and contributing assets, as determined through the accurate 
outlining of the actual transaction, will be entitled to an appropriate return 
reflecting the value of their contributions. Specific guidance will ensure that the 
analysis is not weakened by asymmetry in information corresponded between 
the tax administration and the taxpayer in relation to hard-to-value intangibles, or 
by using special contractual relationships, such as a cost contribution 
arrangement”.10 
The revision also looked  at situations  where a capital-rich member of the group 
provides funding but performs few activities. If it is found that the capital rich member 
country does not perform any due diligence to ensure that the  financial risk it is 
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 Cost Contribution Arrangements (CCAs) are contractual agreements between associated enterprises in an MNE 
group in which the participants share certain costs and risks in return for having a proportionate interest in the 
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undertaking by providing the funding, then the associated profits will not be allocated to 
the group member providing the funding . “The associated enterprise would be entitled to no 
more than a risk-free return, or less if, for example, the transaction is not commercially rational 
and therefore the guidance on non-recognition applies (OECD BEPS Reports, 2015).” 
Lastly, the adjustment sought to safeguard that pricing methods used would apportion 
profits to the most significant economic activities. It will no longer be possible to assign 
the synergistic benefits of functioning as a group to members other than the ones 
actually adding to such synergistic benefits.  The final report in 2015 included a 
mandate for follow-up work to be done on the transactional profit split method. 
Finalisation of this follow up was earmarked for the middle of 2017. During September 
2017, a discussion draft titled, “Revised guidance on Profit Splits” was issued for public 
comment. “This work has led to detailed guidance on the ways in which this method can 
usefully and appropriately be applied to align transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, 
including in the circumstances of integrated global value chains (OECD, 2018).” This profit 
split method is aimed at dividing the profit generated in the controlled transaction 
between the associated enterprises in the same proportion/split that would have been 
achieved in an arm’s length transaction. The profit split method was part of the 
guidelines since 2010 and could be used where it was proven to be the best method at 
hand, but the revision significantly expands when the transactional method may be the 
most appropriate method (OECD, 2018). 
 
Action Plan 13 – Transfer pricing documentation 
Transfer pricing analysis depends on access to relevant information. In terms of  
Country by Country reporting (CbCr) requirements, MNE’s  must provide information  on 
their functions  in every jurisdiction in which they operate. These reports will allow tax 
authorities to determine the level of transfer pricing risk and other BEPS related risks 
that  may exist with respect to the MNE Groups operating within their borders (OECD 
BEPS Reports, 2015). This is definitely a step in the right direction. There is still much 
work being done and much guidance being issued by the OECD regarding the 
implementation and requirements around this Action plan. As MNE’s and tax 
administrators grapple with and prepare the required documentation for their first round 
of CbCr submissions, time will tell if the expected outcome of this revision, being access 
to relevant and reliable data for comparability will be obtained.  It is important to 




issue guidelines. Governments and their respective tax authorities are the ones who will 
have to decide to implement BEPS into their domestic tax law and this will likely lead to 
a significant variation in the timing of implementation and interpretation of how the rules 
will be applied. 
 
2.5 South Africa after the OECD Final BEPS Reports 
In summary, the Davis Tax Committee recommended the following as it relates to the 
Action plan 8-10 and Action plan 13 
 ”Although the OECD report on Actions 8 to10 indicates that further work is still to follow, 
based on the DTC’s analysis of the recommended changes to be made to the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines as a consequence of the Action 8 to 10 OECD Report, and in line with 
the recommendations on the OECD Action 13 Report, in order to reduce the incidence of 
income not being taxed in South Africa when the risks, functions and values actually 
take place here, South Africa adopts all the OECD recommendations pertaining to 
transfer pricing rules and documentation (BEPS Sub Committee, 2015)." 
In the 2017 Budget Review delivered on 22 February 2017, the South African Minister 
of Finance set out South Africa’s position on the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action 
items. 
Regarding: Action 8 – 10: Transfer pricing (alignment of outcomes with value 
creation) 
”The South African Revenue Service (SARS) is updating the Transfer Pricing Practice 
Note in line with OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to include new guidance on the 
arm’s-length principle and an agreed approach to ensure appropriate pricing on 
intangibles that are difficult to value.” 
Regarding Action 13: Transfer pricing documentation 
“The Tax Administration Act provides the legal basis for country-by-country reporting 
CbCr, where the term “international tax standard” has been included, covering CbCr. 
Regulations were gazetted in December 2016. For multinational enterprises with fiscal 
years starting on or after 1 January 2016, the first CbCr will be required to be filed with 
SARS from 31 December 2017.” 
In addition, the DTC advises that the country-by-country report for South Africa should 
include extra transactional information about related party interest payments, royalty 




assessments where it is challenging to get information on the processes of a 
multinational business (BEPS Sub Committee, 2015). 
2.6 Post BEPS and the Arm’s length principle: 
The BEPS plans were finalised and released in 2015.The OECD’s intended outcome of 
the BEPS project was to provide assurance to tax authorities and the global community 
that profits are taxed where the economic activity creating the profit is generated and 
the value is created. Of the fifteen action plans, three of these action plans (8 -10) as 
discussed earlier in this chapter focused on aligning transfer pricing outcomes with 
value creation (Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016).The project was a reactive response by 
the OECD (which consist of the worlds’ major and emerging economies), to the wide 
perception that the global MNE’s are not paying their fair share of taxes in the global 
economy in which it operates. 
In a journal article by Mansori and Sanschagrin, two key reasons were identified why 
the primary objective of the BEPS project, which was the alignment of transfer pricing 
outcomes with value creation, may not result in the OECD’s intended outcome. Instead 
it could potentially go against the arm’s length principle in a number of ways (Mansori & 
Sanshagrin, 2016).  
The first shortcoming identified is the fact that value creation is not defined in the BEPS 
plans. This means that a transfer price is being aligned to an undefined concept. This 
could lead to different interpretations of the meaning of value creation and ultimately the 
distortion of an arm’s length transfer price. With value creation being left undefined, tax 
authorities might interpret the concept to be similar to value added.  
Mansori and Sanshagrin explain it as follows:  
“Value added is measured simply by comparing the value of inputs with the value of 
outputs; the difference between the two is the value added by that step in the value 
chain. The concept is straightforward and particularly easy to apply to traditional 
manufacturing companies. And since the central concept of the OECD’s prime directive 
is left undefined, it is not difficult to imagine that many will instead focus on the well-
understood concept of value added when examining taxpayers’ transfer pricing 
outcomes. This is particularly likely in tax jurisdictions where relatively high value-added 
pieces of the production process are located. But the value created within an MNE may 
involve far more than what is happening at any given stage in the value chain, especially 
for many of today’s companies whose outputs may be services, information, 
technologies, know-how, brand awareness, and ideas. MNEs amass and put at risk 




with highly specialized abilities from across the globe, and develop market and 
bargaining power far beyond the reach of most individuals. These attributes of modern 
MNEs are often tremendously important profit drivers, even though there may be no 
stage in the value chain where they are directly measurable (Mansori & Sanshagrin, 
2016).” 
Another shortcoming identified in the measurement of value creation is from whose 
perspective the measure needs to be valued. Should it be measured from the 
customer’s perspective, the shareholders perspective or some other measure that the 
MNE’s uses to generate taxable profits. Value creation extends beyond transfer pricing, 
as stated in the Economist. In the same article it goes on to ask what potentially would 
be the best measure; would it be the stock market value, the balance sheet value or 
even some other value like future performance (Economist, 2009).  
Economic factors such as supply and demand, risk tolerance and bargaining powers 
are also factors to be considered when considering adherence to the arm’s length 
principle. Another factor / concept that business and tax experts identify as being an 
important feature of arms’ length pricing is value capture. This is a completely different 
concept to value creation. Value capture is described as “the ability to extract rents 
without necessarily creating value. Bargaining power and risk appetite play key roles in 
value capture (Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016) .”  An example of value capture would be 
“a parent/ holding company that own a valuable intangible. This company would have greater 
bargaining and negotiating powers when negotiating a favourable outcome with local country 
businesses such as retailers and distributors, who might be looking to have the product in their 
store, based on consumer demand (Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016).”   
The following example was used in the article by Mansori and Sanchagrin to illustrate 
how the prime objective in a post BEPS environment of matching profits to where value 
is created in MNE’s might be at odds with the arms’ length principle. 
“Suppose a pharmaceutical company hires a research team to develop a new drug, 
analogous to a contract research and development entity. If things go well, the value 
added by the research team will be far greater than its compensation. In fact, that is the 
goal of the corporation. Yet even though the compensation paid by the MNE to the 
research team is hoped to be much less than the value captured by the company, the 
arrangement is, by definition, arm’s length. Why don’t the researchers demand and 
receive compensation equal to the value they add to the firm? Or put another way, why 
don’t they independently develop the new drug so that they can capture more of the 
value they have created for themselves? Because the other ways in which the enterprise 




institutional know-how, and corporate culture supporting innovation necessary to derive 
value from a new drug, and by having the market clout to fully capitalize on the new 
product make the entire endeavour more successful for both the firm and the team when 
they work together (Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016). In the absence of a clear definition of 
the term ‘‘value creation,’’ a transfer pricing analysis that follows the OECD’s prime 
directive may well note that the bulk of the value added for this firm is in the R&D and 
marketing departments, with perhaps a small (‘‘routine’’) amount attributable to corporate 
functions. The analysis, without considering a broader perspective that would include 
value capture, may conclude that the MNE’s profits should be distributed likewise 
(Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016).” 
“Now consider where the “central company” outsources all the functions such as R&D, 
administration and marketing. Each of these companies would be compensated in line 
with what they would routinely earn for similar services and the majority of the profits 
earned from selling the product would then lie with the central company taking all the 
risks, as this company now has the greatest bargaining power. These transactions would 
all be arm’s length and the outcomes could not be disputed by any tax authority (Mansori 
& Sanshagrin, 2016).” 
Therefore, while it is agreed that value creation is an important factor in determining the 
arm’s length nature of a controlled transaction, it should not necessarily be the key 
factor. With undefined value creation as the central measure, the OECD transfer pricing 
guidelines is creating unintended burdens for the MNE, due to the widely different 
interpretations of what is meant by value creation and how it could be applied in transfer 
pricing analysis by various tax authorities. 
 
2.7 Chapter summary 
In summary, this chapter looked at the OECD as an organisation, and its significant 
influence on global policy setting across many sectors.    
The chapter addressed the challenges faced by emerging economies as well as 
developed economies as it relates to transfer pricing and BEPS by MNE’s. South 
Africa’s relationship with the OECD was discussed as well as the impact of BEPS on 
the country’s domestic revenue. The chapter also discussed the Davis Tax Committee, 
its role in the BEPS action plan review and its recommendation to National Treasury to 
consider incorporating the revisions as recommended in the BEPS Action plans for 
transfer pricing into South Africa’s domestic tax law. It looked at how concerns and 
frustrations raised by the G20 in 2012 led to development of these OECD BEPS Action 




A review of the BEPS action plans as finalised in 2015 was made and certain 
weaknesses in the post BEPS transfer pricing environment were highlighted. The key 
weakness being that value creation was not defined in the BEPS Action plans which 
has left the meaning of this concept open to interpretation by MNE’s and tax authorities 
alike. This means that the very achievement of an arm’s length transfer price that is 
aligned to value creation could potentially become even more distorted as tax 
authorities and MNE’s could apply their own interpretation and meaning of value 
creation. It highlights the fact that the OECD BEPS team and MNE tax practitioners will 
have to look to develop more frameworks that encourage the use of more profit drivers 
not just value creation, to determine arms’ length prices as transfer pricing arrangement 
gets developed and implemented (Mansori & Sanshagrin, 2016). 
Having identified and addressed some of the challenges faced with the arm’s length 
principle, and those new ones created with the implementation of BEPS, it leads to the 
question , are there alternate methods available that could be used? Some alternative 
methods to the arm’s length pricing method as advocated by the OECD were identified 
and suggested by the Tax Justice Network (TJN) earlier in this chapter. The TJN have 
been lobbying for a complete overhaul of the international tax for a number of years. 
This outcry by the TJN is based on the fact that the organisation is of the opinion that 
there are oalternativer methods available other than the arm’s length principle that could 
create a far more equitable split of profits amongst group companies for tax purposes 
and prevent the profit shifting practices that is possible with the arm’s length pricing 












CHAPTER 3: FORMULARY APPORTIONMENT 
This chapter will look at formulary apportionment as a possible alternative to arm’s 
length pricing. The advantages and disadvantages of this method will be discussed as 
well as how it differs to the arm’s length principle and its overall suitability as an 
alternative or supplementary method in the international taxation environment. 
  
3.1 What is formulary apportionment? 
Formulary apportionment is a method of allocating profit earned or losses incurred by a 
company or a group of companies to a particular tax jurisdiction in which the company 
or group has a taxable presence (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011). Formulary 
apportionment allocates the group’s total worldwide profit (or loss) to each jurisdiction, 
based on factors such as the proportion of sales, assets or payroll in that jurisdiction 
(Altshuler, 2010).The method does not look to separate accounting as the arm’s length 
principle does. When applied to a corporate group, formulary apportionment requires 
combined reporting of the group's results. The parent and all of its subsidiaries are 
viewed as though they were a single entity and it would pay domestic company taxes on 
the share of its worldwide income that is allocated to each jurisdiction (Altshuler, 2010). 
The domestic taxation laws applicable in each tax jurisdiction will be used to calculate 
the tax obligation for a particular MNE in a particular jurisdiction. In this manner there is 
still compliance with the domestic tax legislation. The formula only aims to provide an 
equitable share of the MNE’s profits or losses to a particular tax jurisdiction, regardless 
of its status as a high or low tax jurisdiction (Durst, 2015). 
“The central principle of formulary apportionment is that income should be attributed, for 
tax purposes to the locations where business activities are performed. The core function 
of formulary apportionment allows income only to be allocated to places where real 
business activity takes place and in quantitative proportion to the extent of that activity. 
So the very application of formulary apportionment to a taxpayer’s income from all 
sources would by its very nature eliminate BEPS completely” (Durst, 2015). 
Formulary apportionment is a much-debated topic amongst tax commentators and there 
are varying opinions on how and to what extent formulary apportionment can be 
integrated with the current arm’s length method for transfer pricing.  
The OECD Guidelines for Transfer Pricing 2017 do not recognise formulary 
apportionment as a realistic alternative to the arm’s length principle (OECD, 2017, p. 
par1.32:pg46). The OECD is of the opinion that the system will not adequately protect 




“a move to global formulary apportionment would require a level of international co-operation 
that is unrealistic in the field of international taxation (OECD, 2017, p. par 1.24:page 41).” 
Affected parties in a transaction would each want to include factors that would 
advantage them, and this could lead to a situation where agreements on the basis of 
the formula may not be reached. So, it would seem that one of the problems with 
formulary apportionment would be that affected parties would want to show results that 
best advantage them by including factors into the pre-agreed formula that would favour 
their particular organisation. The current problem with arms’ length is that taxpayers are 
making adjustments to comparables by considering factors that is favouring their 
enterprises. So there appears to be a problem with taxpayers serving their self- interest 
regardless of the method. 
The UN Tax Model, like the OECD Tax Model supports the arm’s length principle as the 
basis for establishing an arm’s length price. Unlike the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines 2017, The UN Transfer Pricing Manual does not reject global formulary 
apportionment as a transfer pricing method. It acknowledges and recognises that there 
could be instances where formulary apportionment could be used as an alternative to 
the arm’s length principle (The United Nations, 2017, p. B1.4.14;page 37). 
3.2 The European Union (EU) and formulary apportionment 
The European Union11 consists of 28 member states. The union serves as a unified 
trade and monetary body. These states all maintain their sovereignty and independence 
but in areas where it makes sense to make joint decisions for the benefit of the union, 
they have created shared institutions that facilitates a democratic decision making 
process on specific matters of common interest to the member states (Commission, 
2018). 
“Several institutions are involved in making decisions at EU level, in particular: 
 the European Parliament, which represents the EU's citizens and is directly elected 
by them; 
 the European Council, which consists of the Heads of State or Government of the 
EU Member States; 
 the Council, which represents the governments of the EU Member States; and 
the European Commission, which represents the interests of the EU as a whole 
(Commission, 2018).” 
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The EU as a body is not responsible for setting tax rates and collecting taxes, the 
national governments of the member states are responsible for these functions. The 
member states are free to design and implement tax laws that will serve their national 
priorities but in doing this they still need to ensure compliance with some of the 
fundamental principles of the EU. These would be non-discrimination and respect for 
free movement of goods and services in the single market12. Although the Member 
States are free to develop their own tax laws, there is an expectation that the laws will 
not allow people or business to escape paying their fair share of taxes in another state. 
The EU acknowledged that addressing the issues of tax avoidance and even tax 
evasion, these matters required action and input from all the member states. It is a 
requirement that on matters such as tax issues all the member states needs to agree 
on any decisions made to ensure that the interest of every EU country is considered. 
With issues such as BEPS on the rise the EU member states work together to try and 
ensure that taxation stays fair (Commission, 2018).  
In September 2004 discussions around the implementation of a common tax base for 
members of the EU started to take place (D Pirvu, 2011, p. 199). “The aim of this initiative 
was to create a common tax base through the use of formulary apportionment for the activities 
of a transnational company. The income and expenses will be consolidated in one state, where 
the parent company is located, and the taxable profits will then be calculated in this one state. 
The tax will be paid in that one state and subsequently distributed to the other states where the 
parent company has activities (D Pirvu, 2011, p. 199).”  
The European Union (EU) adopted a formulary approach, which can be implemented at 
the option of the taxpayer to harmonise its corporate taxes under the Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) initiative.13 
The easiest way to explain the effects of the CCCTB proposal is to examine how it 
works in practice, which is demonstrated by means of the following examples: 
 
                                                          
12
 The Single Market refers to the EU as one territory without any internal borders or other regulatory obstacles to the 
free movement of goods and services. A functioning Single Market stimulates competition and trade, improves 
efficiency, raises quality, and helps cut prices. The European Single Market is one of the EU’s greatest 
achievements. (Commision, 2017) 
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 “Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) initiative: The Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) is a 
single set of rules to calculate companies' taxable profits in the EU. With the CCCTB, cross-border companies will only have to 
comply with one, single EU system for computing their taxable income, rather than many different national rulebooks. (The 






“Member State A allows assets to be depreciated over ten years, for tax purposes, 
while member State B allows for depreciation over five years. Member State A allows 
for a deduction for all entertainment expenses, while Member State B does not. A 
common corporate tax base means that these rules would be the same throughout the 
European Union and companies would only need to do their calculations based on one 
set of tax rules. Without consolidation, the company would need to make a separate 
calculation and file a separate tax return for each Member State in which it has a 
taxable presence. This would still be easier than today, however, as the rules for this 
calculation would be uniform across all Member States. Under the proposed 
consolidation, all profits and losses from the companies of a group in different Member 
States would be totalled in order to calculate a net profit or loss for the group’s entire 
EU activity. Based on this net figure, common rules would be used to determine the 
final tax base of the group (Hoffmanns, et al., 2017).” 
Example 2 
“A group consists of companies A, B, C and D, each in a different Member State.  
Companies A and B have profits of EUR 10 million each, Company C has a profit of 
EUR  5 million and Company D has a loss of  EUR 8 million. The consolidated tax base 
(net profit) of this group is A + B + C –D = EUR 17 million. This profit must then be 
apportioned between the relevant member States (Hoffmanns, et al., 2017).” 
The CCCTB project was initially launched in 2011 but it was seen as being too 
aggressive in its dual implementation of consolidation and formulary apportionment. By 
their own admission the EU stated that they were not too sure what the resultant impact 
would be on member states’ domestic revenue with the implementation of this 
approach. This raised wide spread concern and member states showed a great level of 
resistance. A Common Corporate Tax Base (CCTB) was then proposed, removing the 
consolidation step (Roder, 2012, p. 131).  
In the relaunch in 2016, the CCCTB and the CCTB were launched together. The 
CCCTB is mandatory for MNE’s that earn income exceeding a certain threshold and it’s 
optional to any other member state, who might not necessarily meet the income 
threshold but wishes to comply with the CCCTB  (Kolbe, 2017, pp. 18 - 23). In 2016, the 




Corporate Tax system in the European Union”.14 The aim of the document was to set 
out how the OECD/G20 BEPS measures can be implemented within the EU (The 
United Nations, 2017, p. B1.3.12:page 32). 
3.3 Differences between Formulary Apportionment and Arm’s Length Pricing. 
The fundamental difference between these two methods is that the arm’s length pricing 
method is founded on the principle that one is to respect the internal divisions that 
multinational corporations create in the form of subsidiaries, holding companies, parent 
companies etc. and attempt to regulate transactions between them (The United Nations, 
2017, p. B1.4.1: page 35). Formulary apportionment disregards those legal distinctions 
and looks at a company as a large, single unit, and then determines a top-down division 
of its income into countries based on agreed-upon factors (Reuven, 2010). The aim of 
this method is to tax portions of a multinational company’s income without referring to 
the group structure in any way. In addition, multinational enterprises, with the same total 
income, are generally treated the same under this method (Gharky, 2012). 
 
3.4 Challenges of Formulary Apportionment 
The following reasons have been given by a number of critics of the method as the 
reasons for finding the formulary apportionment method unfavourable in the context of 
international taxation. A general opinion is that it is found to be inflexible. Some 
commentators are of the opinion that individual facts and circumstances are 
disregarded in the formulary approach and as a results acts in an arbitrary manner 
(Gharky, 2012)  The system would not protect against double taxation. It would require a 
high level of international coordination amongst parties and consensus amongst 
countries would be necessary. All countries would have to agree on a predetermined 
formula and on all the factors contained within it (Reuven, et al., 2009). There are also a 
number of factors that the formulary approach cannot accommodate for, such as the 
issue of intangibles, and the difficulty in determining where the income is produced with 
intangibles. So this implies that intangibles would not be used in the formula and that 
then eliminates the formulary approach for e-commerce transactions (Cockfield, 2004). 
Another challenge is the fact that different countries have different accounting and tax 
rules which regulate definitions of income as well as deductions for everything from 
interest to depreciation to pension contributions. These rules reflect the political, social 
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 Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax system in the European Union: The Action Plan aims to establish a new approach 
to corporate taxation in the EU to tackle tax avoidance, ensure sustainable revenues and foster a better business 




and economic climate of each particular country. For formulary apportionment to work, 
the tax and accounting rules of each country would need to be standardised in order to 
arrive at a uniform definition of the taxable base subject to apportionment (Reuven, 
2010). To achieve this, countries would have to give up control over a major portion of 
their domestic policy. It is highly unlikely that this loss of control would be politically 
acceptable by any country (Gharky, 2012, pp. 10-11). 
 
3.5 Countries currently applying formulary apportionment. 
Formulary apportionment and unitary taxation15 originated in the United States over a 
century ago. It was in a response to the difficulties that U.S. states were having in taxing 
railroads (Durst, 2015). The formulary principle may be applied in multiple ways. 
Versions of the method are used to assign taxing rights over enterprises between the 
states of the United States and the provinces of Canada. The formulas historically used 
by some US states involve sales, payroll expenses and the value of plant and 
equipment. Currently many US states use only sales as a single factor (Durst, 2015).  
In Canada the system that is used generally divides companies’ income among the 
provinces according to a two-factor formula using sales volumes and payroll expenses. 
An equal weighting is given to both factors. By doing this the tax obligation of a 
company to any one provincial government is determined by the proportion of total 
company sales and payroll costs that is made in that province (Durst, 2015).  
It is important to note, for the purpose of distinction, that formulary apportionment and 
unitary taxation is not equivalent. Formulary allocation is a method used to allocate 
income and losses. This method does not seek to determine the market price of the 
relevant associated transactions that produced the income or losses. Unitary taxation 
is a method whereby all the MNE income sources get consolidated. This method is 
beneficial to corporations as it allows them to consolidate losses and income from 
different tax jurisdictions (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011, p. 381). 
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“Even though a consolidated unitary setting requires an allocation formula – allocation 
formulas could be used also in other settings. A formulary allocation can be applied to 
a specific source of MNE income (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011, p. 382).” 
 
3.6 Voices for a change from current international transfer pricing practices 
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel-prize winner and one of the most outspoken critics of global 
economic inequality recommends scrapping the arms-length principle.  He is of the 
opinion that small tweaks to the guidelines will not prevent aggressive, artificial moves 
by MNE’s to divert earnings and profits to low-tax countries. Another disadvantage to 
the arm’s length method is that countries that lack the ability to keep up with 
sophisticated and complex profit manipulation is exploited (Parker, 2014). The Tax 
Justice Network has always been strong lobbyist for reform of the international practices 
surrounding transfer pricing. The organisation has been a strong supporter of formulary 
apportionment, unitary taxation and country-by-country reporting. On 14 March 2012,  at 
the meeting on Transfer Pricing sponsored by the UN Financing for Development Office 
at the UN in New York, David Spencer, a senior advisor to the Tax Justice Network 
delivered a statement  which read as follows .  
 “The Tax Justice Network calls for objective analysis of Transfer Pricing issues, 
especially in the context of the needs of developing countries. The Tax Justice Network 
(“TJN”) does not agree with the OECD about several transfer pricing issues, including for 
example the following: First, the OECD continues to assert that the arm’s-length 
principle developed decades ago is still “sound in theory.” TJN believes that the OECD’s 
theory of the arm’s-length principle no longer applies to multinational enterprises which 
are highly integrated, and that comparables in many, if not most cases cannot be found. 
Second, the OECD is asserting orthodoxy, as evidenced by (a) its deletion of Article 7(4) 
of the OECD Model Income Tax Treaty, (b) the OECD’s continued opposition to the 
Brazilian transfer pricing method, and (c) the OECD’s continued insistence on imposing 
the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines on developing countries. As U.N. Assistant 
Secretary General Jomo K. Sundaram pointed out quite clearly in his presentation at the 
meeting on transfer pricing here at the UN in June 2011, the OECD Guidelines have 
been developed by a small group of countries, which are rich. Third, the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines are so complex that even the tax administrations of many developed 
countries cannot adequately administer those rules. Therefore, how can developing 
countries, especially the least developed countries, be expected to administer 
adequately those rules? Fourth, in effect the OECD continues to assert that there are 




apportionment which the OECD rejects. TJN believes that the arm’s-length principle is 
broader than the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and also that there is a spectrum 
of transfer pricing methods, including for example, combinations of (a) an arm’s-length 
principle when comparables can easily be determined and (b) formulary apportionment 
concepts in other situations.” 
Mr. David Rosenbloom, former International Tax Counsel at the U.S. Treasury 
Department has called the arm’s-length system as it operates today basically unusable. 
However given treaty obligations and problems of international continuation he 
conceded that we are bound to it. He is of the opinion that there must not be a 
separation between the arm’s-length and formulary methods (Sullivan, 2010). He 
suggested a possible solution whereby the US tax collection services ( could be applied 
to other tax administrations also) would by default apply a formulary apportionment of 
profits but taxpayers would be allowed to refute the formulary method with reference to 
arm’s-length principles. Rosenbloom commented that this could be a variation of the 
Brazilian system,  that was implemented in 1997. The system is reliant  on formulary 
methods and fixed-mark-up safe harbours. This approach is not regarded as compliant 
with the OECD’s arm’s-length standard (Sullivan, 2010). 
The Independent Commission for the Reform of International Corporate Taxation 
(ICRICT) has launched a roadmap to taxing multinationals. The commission was 
established by a broad coalition of civil society and labour organisations, including TJN, 
with the aims of: 
 promoting the international corporate tax reform debate through a wider and more 
inclusive discussion of international tax rules than is possible through any other 
existing forum; 
 to consider reforms from a perspective of public interest rather than national 
advantage; and 
 to seek fair, effective and sustainable tax solutions for development. (Cobnam, 2018 
(a)). 
In the opinion of the ICRICT, this roadmap serves as an important intervention that not 
only confirms the failure of current tax rules to deliver fair outcomes internationally, but 
sets the course for a specific alternative that would significantly strengthen fiscal 
sovereignty for countries at all income levels through unitary taxation with formulary 




In an article, written by Alex Cobnam and published on the TJN website in February 
2018 regarding the ICRICT roadmap for taxing multinationals, he wrote the following: 
”Three months ago, the Paradise Papers have prompted again the citizens’ indignation 
against the way multinational corporations avoid paying their fair share of taxation. 
ICRICT is launching today a new publication presenting concrete solutions to reorient 
the existing system of international taxation away from serving the wealthy few and to 
focus it instead on addressing the needs of the vast majority of the population. After 
evaluating many alternatives, ICRICT proposes a solution to a failing system. Global 
formulary apportionment, coupled with a minimum corporate tax rate, is the only 
effective way for all countries to collect a fair share of tax revenue from multinational 
enterprises and avert a race to the bottom” (Cobnam, 2018 (a)). 
 
3.7 Is formulary apportionment a viable alternative or at least another approach to 
consider? 
In an article by Kash Mansori titled – “there must be a better way” he poses the   
following question, “Wouldn’t life be simpler for both taxpayers and tax authorities if they didn’t 
have to worry about finding arm’s length prices to apply to all of the transactions that take place 
within a multinational group? (Mansori, 2014).” 
He proceeds to answer his question and states that formulary apportionment appears to 
be the tempting alternative to arm’s length for a variety of reasons, mainly the removal 
of complex exercises to determine comparable prices, and the elimination of the 
complex weaves of intragroup structures. However, he acknowledges that an effort to 
move toward formulary apportionment would almost certainly create at least as many 
challenges as it would resolve. An effective corporate tax system should prevent   the 
introduction of distortionary information into the economic decision-making process, so 
that projects or transactions occur when they have economic merit and not when they 
don’t. But unless there is an international agreement on the use of apportionment, as 
well as on the factors to be used in the specific formula, the application of formulary 
apportionment could create very distortionary results. (Mansori, 2014). 
The concept of formulary apportionment and exactly how it operates in a trading 
environment can have many challenges. Consider a scenario where, one country uses 
apportionment while its’ trading partner country does not. In this situation it is inevitable 
that a company doing business in both these tax jurisdictions would contend with a 
number of situations where certain activities would result in no tax, while other activities 




activities that makes commercial sense and is economically worthwhile would never 
happen, while other activities would occur simply for the tax benefit it will provide. These 
actions by MNE’s would inevitably lead to the misallocation of resources and ultimately 
a loss to society in an attempt to maintain or reduce an enterprises’ overall tax liability. 
(Mansori, 2014). The impact exchange rates could have on the allocation of profits and 
inevitably tax is also highlighted in the article by the following statement made by the 
author, “Under formulary apportionment, exchange rate movements would alter how much tax 
a multinational owed in each country by affecting any elements of the allocation formula that are 
measured in units of currency, such as sales or assets. For example, if China’s currency were to 
continue to strengthen against the dollar over time, China would be able to claim a larger and 
larger share of the income of multinationals doing business there, even if those multinationals 
had no change in their sales or transactions (Mansori, 2014).” 
One of the biggest pitfalls created by formulary apportionment is the two extreme 
outcomes that could occur, either double taxation or non- taxation in certain instances. 
Let’s consider a business environment where formulary apportionment is internationally 
accepted. This would require that all the countries involved should come to an 
agreement on a common formula to be used to split up the multinationals income. It 
would be a natural and expected response to have the tax administrators of the different 
countries’ lobbying for the inclusion of elements in the formula that would benefit them 
specifically. And if in some way a common formula can be agreed on, it could and would 
most likely lead to situations where the MNE’s would manipulate the elements of the 
formula by engaging in economic activity with no real economic rationale. This in turn 
would result in distortion of real economic activity in order to get the best outcome in the 
common formula (Mansori, 2014). The apportionment method could also create a 
number of accounting challenges for multinationals. These MNE’s would have to 
compile and present data on the worldwide activities of the group to each of the 
countries in which the MNE’s operates. This information will have to be in compliance 
with the specific book and accounting rules required in that particular jurisdiction 
(Mansori, 2014). Formulary apportionment is regarded as compatible with country-by-
country reporting (CbCr); a concept developed by TJN’s co- founder and senior adviser, 
Richard Murphy in 2003 and could serve as the accounting basis for formulary 
apportionment. It should be noted that a version of CbCr as developed by Richard 
Murphy has been incorporated into the OECD Guidelines for Transfer Pricing as part of 




former Treasury official David Ernick who are of the opinion that the OECD’s support for 
the arm’s length principle is starting to waver and that country by country reporting as 
implemented in terms of BEPS Action plan 13 will encourage global companies to 
allocate their profits based on a formula anyway. Ernick is quoted as follows on the 
matter, “That information is really not relevant to determining transfer pricing risk, if your 
transfer pricing is based on the arm's-length principle. The question they're essentially asking is 
'Does your allocation of profits around the world line up as it would if you had used a formulary 
approach?'  They're kind of mixing apples and oranges (Parker, 2013).” So it would appear as 
if CbCr could be clearing the path for formulary apportionment (Parker, 2013). 
Michael Durst, an advocate for formulary apportionment is of the opinion that country by 
country reporting as adopted by the OECD, “would show the presence and extent of any 
disconnects between where business activity is conducted and where income is treated as 
earned for tax purposes” (Parker, 2013). This is fundamentally what formulary 
apportionment aims to eliminate at the end of the day, and commentators like Michael 
Durst whom are of the opinion that the arm’s length principle is too easily manipulated 
acknowledges that the implementation of country by country reporting might be the first 
modest step in that direction (Parker, 2013) . 
Reuven Avi-Yonah, director of the international tax program at the University of 
Michigan Law School, holds a different view. He does not think that CbCr would create 
a fundamental shift in the current transfer pricing methods.  He is quoted as saying “It's 
not information that internationals don't have. They have to file these returns, based on transfer 
pricing principles. All that country-by-country reporting will do is to make this public. It doesn't 
have anything to do with formulary apportionment. It's based on the arm's-length system 
(Parker, 2013).” 
It is acknowledged and accepted that the current arm’s length principle has its noted 
shortcomings and allows for a large degree of economic distortion. However until such 
time that the formulary apportionment method shows to be an unambiguous 
improvement on the current system, the enormously expensive and complex task of 
shifting the world economy to formulary apportionment will not be considered as a 
rational solution either (Parker, 2014). Aside from the challenges that will indeed be 
created if the formulary method should ever be implemented, moving to formulary 
apportionment may not really be able to produce a system that is any more fair to 




difficult for developing countries to enforce this method as the arm's-length standard. 
And the prospect of reaching an agreement on a universal formula among all of the 
world's nations seems like a daunting, if not impossible task (Parker, 2014). 
There are many commentators who are in support of the formulary approach and 
recognize the need for a change, but they are not necessarily convinced that a 
complete shift toward formulary apportionment and away from arm’s length method 
would necessarily provide the relief and outcome that is required (Avi-Yonah & 
Benshalom, 2011). Neither the formulary apportionment system nor the arm’s length 
pricing system is perfect. It has been proposed by some advocates of formulary 
apportionment that a hybrid regime be created. In this proposed regime the arm’s length 
method is applied when there are adequate market comparables available to do so, and 
the formulary approach will be applied when the arm’s length system cannot provide 
equitable results (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011). This hybrid system was also referred 
to by David Spencer in his statement at the meeting on Transfer Pricing held at the UN 
Financing Development Office in New York on 14 March 2012 as quoted earlier in this 
paper.   
The global economy is constantly changing and this requires that policymakers adapt 
with the changes and adopt the best available methods to allocate income generated by 
MNE activity in an equitable manner. The key advantage of the formulary approach is 
that it constrains income to activity and promotes transparent and consistent treatment 
of intra-group transactions (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011). These advantages should 
not be ignored and it has been suggested by commentators that the formulary method 
could be applied on a selective basis, like any other transfer pricing method. It need not 
be applied to all the income generated by MNE’s. In this manner it becomes an option 
that a taxpayer has access to and an alternative method that can be applied to income 
(Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011).  
Earlier in the chapter the distinction between a formulary approach and a unitary tax 
regime was made. Understanding the fundamental difference between these two 
concepts is a key factor in understanding how the formulary approach could co-exist 
with arm’s length transfer pricing. Keeping in mind the underlying reason for seeking 
alternative or supplementary methods to arm’s length pricing is to create an 
environment where profit shifting is constrained, it becomes very reasonable to accept 
that as flawed as the proposed hybrid regime could be, this proposal could be the 




3.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter  introduced the concept of formulary apportionment and the manner in 
which the method is applied. It is clear that formulary apportionment and the arm’s 
length method are two fundamentally different approaches to transfer pricing. Unlike the 
arm’s length approach which is based on the principle of separate accounting, formulary 
apportionment can be combined with consolidated MNE group income, to tax MNE’s on 
the basis of unitary taxation (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011).  
It also highlighted the fact that the formulary approach, as a method, can be applied to 
MNE income as a whole or to portions of MNE income. It addressed the fact that the 
arm’s length principle was not able to remain optimally functional in the globalised and 
fast paced economy, where the global trading platform has changed significantly and 
transactions have become so unique in its nature that comparable information simply 
does not exist in many instances. The chapter also identified another issue with the 
arm’s length principle, which lies in the method’s inability to allocate the residual income 
that is created from mobile assets and activities whose risks are born by the entire MNE 
group. It was concluded that it’s these assets and activities that created most of the 
avoidance opportunities for MNE’s and where transfer pricing compliance and 
administrative costs were spent (Avi-Yonah & Benshalom, 2011). 
It is this residual income created through these synergies that the arm’s length principle 
is not able to value, as it is not specific to any one transaction and comparable 
information for such income cannot be found. It was proposed that formulary 
apportionment forms part of the arm’s length transfer pricing method and function as a 
transfer pricing method. Even though the OECD rejects the implementation of the 
formulary approach and Unitary Taxation, other bodies like the United Nations and the 
EU are willing to accept the possibility that the formulary method could be incorporated 
into the international tax framework for MNE’s and co-exist with the arm’s length 
principle (Picciotto, 2016).  
This chapter also discussed country by country reporting, which is Action plan 13 of the 
OECD BEPS project and also a reporting method created by Richard Murphy of the 
TJN in 2003. The reporting method was discussed in light of the fact that country by 
country reporting which is founded on the basis of a formulary apportionment is being 




The proposal presented to combine the formulary approach and the arm’s length 
approach, could therefore be a closer reality than we think. By incorporating the 
formulary approach into the existing arm’s length framework, this hybrid regime could 
potentially provide a system for taxing MNE’s that allows the arm’s length principle to be 
applied where comparable data is available and where a comparable price for a 
transaction cannot be determined, the formulary method can then be used to allocate 
this income. This could potentially provide a solution to the challenges faced in South 
Africa and many other developing countries. It could provide a measure of assurance to 
the tax authorities that their jurisdictions will not lose out on tax collections, where 
complex transactions without comparables is entered into by MNE’s. The only challenge 
in using formulary apportionment as an alternative to arm’s length in certain situations is 
that this method cannot address synergistic benefit or intangible income which cannot 
necessarily be allocated to a specific area. So this eliminates the method for industry 
sectors such as technology and pharmaceuticals ( Tax Policy Network, 2016).  
The next chapter of the dissertation will address the Brazilian transfer pricing approach. 
This method functions on the basis of predetermined margins and serves as our second 
alternative or supplementary method to the arm’s length approach in certain instances 

















CHAPTER 4:  BRAZIL’S TRANSFER PRICING POLICY 
The purpose of the dissertation is to determine if South Africa should be looking to 
adopt an alternative or supplementary method to the arm’s length principle when 
addressing the matter of transfer pricing. The two methods selected at the beginning of 
the process was formulary apportionment and predetermined margins as implemented 
in Brazil. In the previous chapter the formulary apportionment alternative was reviewed. 
The rest of this chapter will be a review of the Brazilian transfer pricing policy which is 
based on the use of predetermined margins to set upper and lower limits for income and 
expenses when determining transfer prices for import and export transactions (The 
United Nations, 2017, p. D1.1.2 page 527). 
 
4.1 Transfer Pricing Policies in Brazil 
Prior to December 1995 Brazil took a territorial approach16 to the taxing of MNE’s 
(Gossler, 2017, p. 51). This meant that MNE’s were only taxed on the source of income 
generated within the Brazilian territories. The result of this was that any foreign income 
earned by an enterprise located in Brazil would not be taxed. However as the 
importance of foreign income in the Brazilian economy grew, the approach changed and 
in December 1995 Brazil promulgated Law 9,249 which made it a requirement to 
include profits, and all other income earned outside of Brazil in the tax base of the 
resident MNE (Gossler, 2017, p. 52). So taxes were no longer being calculated on the 
source basis, instead the residence basis was being applied to resident MNE’s. 
Transfer pricing rules were introduced in Brazil in 1996 through the enactment of Law 
9,430 (Valadao, 2013).  
Brazil’s double tax agreements are modelled on the provision contained in paragraph 1 
of Article 9 of the OECD and UN Model Conventions. “Article 9 established the possibility 
of an adjustment in the transfer prices of transactions between related companies resident in 
the contracting countries, according to the arm's length standard (Gossler, 2017, p. 49).” 
However, Brazil’s double taxation agreements of which there are 32 as at end of July 
2017, do not include the provision contained in paragraph 2 of Article 9. This means that 
                                                          
16 According to the territorial principle, there is a taxation only of the income derived from sources 
located in the territory of the taxing State, irrespective of other characteristics which may be involved, such 
as nationality or residence. In order to apply a territorial taxation of MNEs, the criterion for the 
delimitation of tax jurisdiction used was that of material connection, that is, the effective source of 






Brazil has not committed itself to the obligation of granting the correlative price 
adjustment. This means that Brazilian legislature does not commit to adjusting any 
prices to accommodate for double tax (Rocha, 2017, p. 155). Unlike the arm’s length 
principle followed in the OECD Tax Model & the UN Tax Model which seeks to find a 
comparable price, the Brazilian transfer pricing rules were created to determine / limit 
the maximum tax deductible costs or expenses on imports and the minimum taxable 
price on exports (Gossler, 2017, p. 59). 
“Since the determination of the profits and margins that independent parties would 
have in similar transactions is one of the main difficulties of the Arm’s length principle, 
the Brazilian solution of establishing predetermined margins seems to have 
recognized that it would not be possible to acquire this information from either 
taxpayers or tax authorities. In this context it is possible to realise that the adoption of 
predetermined margins represents a ‘compromise between the arm’s length standard 
and practicability especially because the use of such margins is not mandatory 
(Gossler, 2017, p. 59).” 
Brazilian legislation as it relates to transfer pricing deviates from the OECD guidelines in 
the following ways: 
 It uses fixed / predetermined margins independent of the specific situation of the 
taxpayer or the specialised nature of the relevant industry (Medaglio, 2014). 
 Advance pricing agreement procedures are generally not allowed (Medaglio, 2014). 
 The transfer pricing rules is not restricted to cross border transactions between 
related parties as defined. If a Brazilian company trades with a non-related 
company that is situated in a low tax jurisdiction or a tax free regime, then the 
transfer pricing rules are still applied to the transactions (Medaglio, 2014). 
 The rules do not allow taxpayers to adopt the transactional net margin or profit split 
methods (Medaglio, 2014). 
 There is no functional analysis based on the functions performed, the assets used 
and the risks assumed by each party in a controlled transaction (Meyer, 2018).  
“In terms of Law 9.430, the following are subject to transfer pricing rules: 
 cross-border transactions carried out by legal entities incorporated in Brazil when they 
are entered into with related parties; 
 cross-border transactions carried out between a Brazilian resident and a company 
resident in a low-tax jurisdiction or benefiting from a privileged tax regime irrespective 
of whether they qualify as related parties; and 




The Brazilian Transfer pricing rules are limited to the extent that the rules are not 
applicable to cross-border payments of royalties and payments for technical, 
administrative and scientific assistance services including those involving the transfer of 
know-how made by or in favour of Brazilian companies, if such transactions are 
registered with the Brazilian Intellectual Property Agency (Medaglio, 2014). 
 
4.1.1 Parameter and Practice prices 
As a rule, the Brazilian transfer pricing legislation calls for a comparison of two prices, 
namely “practice prices” and “parameter prices”. The practice price is the actual price 
paid or received by the Brazilian taxpayer entering into an affected transaction (Gilleard, 
2015). The parameter price is the price determined when applying one of the transfer 
pricing methods. Whenever the parameter price is lower than the practice price in 
affected import transactions, the difference represents an adjustment to the Brazilian tax 
basis and whenever the parameter price is higher than the practice price in an affected 




Import Transaction: Parameter price on good $100 (based on transfer pricing method) 
                     Practice price on good: $ 130 
So in this instance the cost would be adjusted to $ 100. This way the tax base is not 
eroded by deducting a higher expense. 
 
Export Transaction: Parameter price on good sold $150 (based on transfer pricing 
method) 
                        Practice price on good:  $ 120 
In this instance revenue recognized for tax purposes would be adjusted to $150. 
The highest level of revenue that can be recognized on the transaction will be 
recognized, and in so doing eliminate any tax base erosion. 
Both of these adjustments, for the expense and the revenue, create the biggest benefit 
to the Brazilian revenue collections by ensuring that the highest sales price is charged 
and the lowest possible expense is set- off against it. 





1. Based on parameter prices:    2. Based on practice price 
Revenue   150       Revenue:  120 
Expense (100)       Expense:  (130) 
Profit         50                                                                            Loss     :   (10) 
Based on the difference in the outcome between 1 and 2 above, the impact of setting 
parameter prices is illustrated. With the practice prices, a loss of R 10 would have been 
calculated, but with the predetermined parameter prices, the best result and best tax 
benefit for the jurisdiction is always determined. 
 
4.2 Transfer pricing methods 
 There is no hierarchy of preferred methods (best methods) in the Brazilian 
transfer pricing law, although some of methods are applicable to specific 
industries or transactions (Meyer, 2018). 
 With the exception of transactions involving commodities, where the Brazilian 
transfer pricing rules establish mandatory and specific methods, the taxpayer 
can adopt the most favourable method (Meyer, 2018). 
 In respect of export transactions, if more than one method applies the 
Brazilian taxpayer may adopt the method which results in the lowest export 
parameter price (Meyer, 2018). 
 For import transactions, if more than one method applies the company may 
elect the method resulting in the highest import price (Meyer, 2018). 
4.2.1 Imports 
The following methods are available for calculating transfer prices on imports of goods, 
services and transfers of rights. 
 Comparable Uncontrolled Price method (PCI) 
With this method a transfer price is determined  by using the average price of 
identical or similar products or services in purchase and sale transactions that is 
undertaken in the internal or external market under similar payment conditions 
(Meyer, 2018). 
“This means that a comparable price (benchmark) should be verified through the 
weighted arithmetic average price of the similar or identical goods, services or 
rights: 





(ii) Acquired by the same importing company, from a resident or non-
resident unrelated person; and 
(iii) In a purchase or sale transaction occurring between resident and non-
resident unrelated companies” (Meyer, 2018). 
 Resale price less profit method (PRL) 
This method would be the Brazilian version of the Resale Price Method (RPM) as 
per the OECD. With this method a transfer price is calculated by taking the 
weighted average price for the year of the resale of property, services or rights 
and reducing it by unconditional discounts, taxes and contributions on sales, 
commissions and a gross profit margin determined in the tax legislation. This is a 
very important difference, because unlike the OECD guide that calls for 
comparable information, at this point, the pre-determined margins applied in 
terms of the Brazilian method would be used. The range for this margin can vary 
from 20% to 40% depending on the industry sector the taxpayer operates in, with 
20% being the general predetermined margin (The United Nations, 2017, p. 530). 
 Production cost plus profit method (fixed margin of 20%) 
With this method the average production cost of identical or similar products, 
services or rights in the country in which such products, services or rights were 
originally produced plus a fixed profit margin of 20% of the cost; plus any taxes 
and levies paid in the country of production is used to determine the acceptable 
transfer price. 
When applying this method production costs is limited to costs of goods, 
services, or rights sold. Operating expenses, such as R&D, selling and 
administrative expenses, gets excluded from the production costs of goods sold 
to Brazil when applying this method (The United Nations, 2017, p. 531). 
 The commodity exchange import price (PCI)  
In terms of the new Brazilian method which was introduced by Law 12715/12 in 
2012, Brazilian entities that import commodities traded on internationally 
recognised commodity and futures exchanges must use the method of quotation 
on imports.  “With this method the parameter price is determined by using the average 
price of the daily medium quotes of commodities negotiated in internationally known 
commodities and future exchanges, adjusted by the applicable premiums and other 
variables (Valadao, 2013, p. 6).” 
It was implemented to serve as a mandatory substitute for the traditional CUP 




available on regulated/organised markets. Its aim is to simplify matters and avoid 
price discussion and searching for comparable on commodities where prices are 
available on a global market (Valadao, 2013, p. 12). 
In the case of transactions involving commodities that do not have a quote in a 
commodities exchange market, taxpayers may choose to test the prices on 
import transactions based on information obtained from independent sources, 
provided by internationally recognised institutes involved in research of specific 
sectors (Valadao, 2013, p. 13). 
 
 4.2.2 Exports 
 Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method: ( PVEx ) 
This is the Brazilian variation of the traditional OECD CUP method.” It is defined 
as the weighted average of the export sales price charged by the company to other 
customers or other national exporters of identical or similar property, services, or rights 
during the same tax year using similar payment terms (The United Nations, 2017, p. 
541)”. 
 Wholesale price in country of destination less profit method (PVA) 
With this method “the average wholesale price of identical or similar goods, services or 
rights in the country of destination under similar payment terms, reduced by the taxes 
included in the price imposed by that country and a profit of 15% of the wholesale price” 
is used for transfer pricing purposes (The United Nations, 2017, p. 542). 
 Retail price in country of destination less profit method (PVV)  
This method employs the use of the average retail price of identical or similar 
goods, services or rights in the country of destination under similar payment 
terms, reduced by the taxes included in the price imposed by that country and a 
profit of 30% of the retail price (The United Nations, 2017, p. 542). 
 Cost Plus method (15 % mark-up) 
“This method is defined as the average cost of acquisition of exported goods, services or 
rights increased by taxes and duties imposed by Brazil plus a profit margin of 
15%including any exchange gain variances calculated based on the sum of goods and 
taxes (The United Nations, 2017, p. 542)”. 
 The commodity exchange export price (PECEX) 
Like with import this method only this method can be applied to intercompany 
export of commodities. “The parameter price is the average price of the daily medium 




exchanges, adjusted by the applicable premiums and other variables. In the absence of 
a trading price in commodities and future exchanges, prices could be compared to those 
obtained from independent data sources provided by internationally known research 
institutions (The United Nations, 2017, p. 541).” 
 Transfer pricing on intercompany loans: 
In January 2013 the Brazilian legislation was changed as it related to 
intercompany loans. In terms of the new legislation all intercomoany loans 
became subject to pricing control. This was different to the old legislation which  
required that only loans not registered with the Brazilian Central Bank  had to be 
subject to the transfer pricing control (Medaglio, 2014). 
“In terms of the legislated changes, from 2013 a maximum interest expense and a 
minimum interest income for Brazilian borrowers are now defined as follows: 
 Transaction in USD at a fixed rate: the transfer pricing rate shall 
correspond to the market rate of those Brazilian sovereign bonds 
indexed in USD, issued by the government on the external market. 
 Transactions in Brazilian Reais (BRL) at a fixed rate: the transfer pricing 
rate shall correspond to the market rate of those Brazilian sovereign 
bonds indexed in BRL, issued by the government on the external market 
 Other cases: The transfer price shall correspond to the Libor rate for six 
month deposits” (Medaglio, 2014).” 
On top of the rates as listed above, a spread rate will be added to determine the 
rate for transfer pricing purposes. The spread rate will be defined by the Brazilian 
treasury. In 2013 the rate was set at 3.5% for regular transactions and 2.5% for 
transaction with taxpayers on low tax jurisdictions. To date these rates remain 
unchanged (Medaglio, 2014). 
 
4.2.3 Challenges faced with some of the methods 
Under Brazilian legislation, the PCI and PVEX (CUP Methods) methods are the 
only methods which depend on a comparability analysis of the goods, services 
and rights. The adoption of these methods relies on the taxpayer having access 
to documentation and information regarding the particular industry sector. This 
information may be difficult to obtain, and as a result taxpayers usually end up 
adopting other methods provided by legislation in which no comparability analysis 




adoption of fixed margins, regardless of particularities of the taxpayer business 
(Valadao, 2013). 
Taxpayers in Brazil also face difficulties in the adoption of the Cost Plus Method 
(CPL method) since the assessment of the parameter price under this method 
depends on the taxpayer verifying and proving the average production cost of 
identical or similar products, services or rights in the jurisdiction in which such 
products, services or rights were originally produced, and again the taxpayer may 
not have access to this information (Medaglio, 2014). 
 
4.3 Safe harbour rules 
 Companies that fall within the parameters, as set in the safe harbour rules in the 
Brazilian transfer pricing policy do not have to defend or prove the legality of the 
transfer prices charged. There are two general safe harbour rules available, and 
two other rules. These other rules, established under Normative Ruling 
1,312/2012, were implemented with the intention of simplifying transfer pricing 
rules and respective inspections. However, these two additional rules are not 
really regarded as safe harbours due to the fact that the Brazilian tax authorities, 
in principle, still have the option of assessing the taxpayer if it is not satisfied with 
the transfer pricing method applied (Valadao, 2013). 
General safe harbour rule #1: “A taxpayer is deemed to have applied an appropriate 
transfer price if the average export sales price is at least 90% of the average domestic 
sale price in the Brazilian market during the same period and on similar payment terms 
(Meyer, 2018).” 
General safe harbour rule #2: “This rule allows a difference of up to 5% (up or 
down) in relation to the overall transactions and 3% (up and down) in relation to the 
transactions subject to the PCI and PECEX (commodity exchange price) methods 
between the adjusted-limit price and the transaction price. (Meyer, 2018)” 
 The other rules established under Normative Ruling 1,312/2012 
These rules allow exporters to prove the correctness  of the transfer pricing 
based wholly on the export transaction documentation if: 
 the exporter can show that the net commercial profit received from the 
export transactions is not less than 10% of the export income, based on the 
annual average of the calendar year and the two last taxable periods, 
provided that the net export revenue to related entities does not exceed 




 The exporter can prove that the net export income dis not more than 5% of 
the total net income in the same calendar year (Meyer, 2018). 
The Brazilian transfer pricing rules are simpler to implement than the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, as well as more effective in countering base erosion 
and profit shifting. A problem does arise though due to the fact that the Brazilian 
domestic transfer pricing rules are primarily based on predetermined profit 
margins and Brazil does not include Article 9(2) of the OECD Model Convention 
in its tax treaties. (Valadao, 2013), so inevitably taxpayers stand the risk of 
double taxation. Brazil does not apply a correlative adjustment to avoid economic 
double taxation derived from transfer pricing adjustments. The transfer pricing 
policies in Brazil will also inevitably lead to the over taxing as well as the under 
taxing of some transactions. This is due to the fact that the mark-up required by 
the method used may be higher or lower than the profits derived by taxpayers 
(Valadao, 2013). 
 
4.4 Strengths of the Brazilian transfer pricing methods: 
The strength of this method is that it removes much of the complexity associated with 
transfer pricing. The method is not based on the use of comparable information. This 
means that the challenge faced by so many countries in just trying to obtain information 
is bypassed. The fact that it is based on certain rules and parameters, enables it to be  
easily implemented by tax authorities and tax payers. It minimises the need for human 
resources with expert technical knowledge and experience on the matters of transfer 
pricing. It assists in stabilizing the expectations in terms of tax collections by the tax 
authorities in a tax jurisdiction (The United Nations, 2017, p. 539). 
                 
4.5 Weaknesses of the Brazilian transfer pricing methods 
Unfortunately the method does not come without weakness. The method carries the risk 
of double taxation where there is no access to negotiate double tax relief via a 
competent authority. In order to implement this method, clear accounting classifications, 
and conformity in allocation of costs between Cost of Goods and operating expenses 
needs to be made. Based on the fact that the fixed margins method applies regardless 
of the cost structures of an organisation, it is unavoidable that some companies could 
be taxed at tax margins that is not proportionate the profitability (The United Nations, 




With a closer look at the matters that have been listed as weaknesses in the Brazilian 
method one comes to realise that many of these weaknesses can be resolved. Firstly in 
the case of potential double taxation, the affected tax authorities can apply for Mutual 
Agreement Procedures (MAP) to be written into the articles of the existing Double Tax 
Agreement between the tax jurisdictions. “MAP is a procedure which allows the Competent 
Authorities17 or designated representatives of the Competent Authorities from the governments 
of the Contracting States/Parties18 to interact with the intent to resolve international tax disputes 
(SARS, 2018).” 
Brazil like many other countries had also adopted the International Accounting 
Standards and in 2007 a new Law 11638 was enacted and took effect in 2008. This law 
requires all Brazilian companies, public or private to use local standards which are 
identical to IFRS (EY, 2010).This means that accounting conformity which has been 
identified as a weakness becomes less of an issue, because the accounting principles 
applied by Brazilian companies is based on the internationally accepted standards. 
The only identified weakness that remains a real unmitigated risk would be the fact that 
the transacting enterprises could be taxed at tax margins which exceeds their 
profitability simply based on the nature and application of predetermined margins which 
does not consider cost structures. The strengths in the system as identified earlier will 
proof to be of real benefit in developing economies. The method eliminates a number of 
barriers that could ensure the tax authorities at least receives some level of tax benefit 
from the MNE’s operating in their jurisdictions. Having reviewed the Brazilian method 
and the strengths and weaknesses of the system, the question that now arises is 
whether this pricing system could be the solution or part of the solution to the 
challenges faced in the developing economies when it comes to transfer pricing. The 
application of this method eliminates the need for comparable information which is one 
of the biggest stumbling blocks for the tax authorities of developing countries and 
developed countries alike. 
In the South African context the Comparable Uncontrolled Price could probably be one 
of the best methods to apply for the export of goods. With this method the price applied 
                                                          
17
 The term "Competent Authority" is used in DTAs and the Multilateral Instrument to identify a position, a person or a 
body within a Contracting State/Jurisdiction to whom issues can be addressed. 
The Competent Authority in South Africa is the Commissioner for SARS and MAP duties have been delegated to 
designated representatives in the Legislative Research and Development subdivision within Legal Counsel (SARS, 
2018). 
18 DTAs or treaties are usually concluded between the governments of two countries. These countries are then 





to intercompany transactions would be the average price charged by the specific 
enterprise on all its non-intercompany transactions for a particular financial year. 
Theoretically this should be the fairest price on which to base an intercompany 




4.6.1 Record Keeping  
All supporting documentation to substantiate the transfer pricing methods used 
must be retained for a period of five years after the financial year in which it was 
applied. This is the period of time that the tax authorities are usually allowed to 
make assessments (Meyer, 2018).   
4.6.2 Level of Documentation  
The documentation requirements are not specified. However if documentation is 
requested by the tax authorities the taxpayer must be able to provide information 
regarding the method used, and the supporting documentation as evidence of 
how the price was determined. Where inadequate or no information is provided 
by the tax payer, the tax authorities  may determine a price  based on available 
documentation and the application of one of the transfer pricing methods as 
prescribed by law (Meyer, 2018).   
4.6.3 Country by Country reporting 
Brazil has recently introduced the country-by-country report CbCr, by means of 
Normative Ruling No. 1,651/2016 (Meyer, 2018). Within the OECD countries, the 
CbCr is part of a three-tiered structure, along with a global master file and a local 
file, which together represent a standardised approach to transfer pricing 
documentation. However, in Normative Ruling No. 1,651/2016, Brazil has only 
introduced the CbCr in itself, without the global master file and the local file. Due 
to the application of predetermined margins the Brazilian tax authorities will not 
be able to use the CbCr for transfer pricing purposes (Medaglio, 2014). 
 
4.7 Similarities between the Brazilian and South African economies 
South Africa and Brazil form part of the five BRICS countries, the other countries being 
Russia, China and India. By 2016, the BRICS block had 41% of the world’s population 




into 2 groups, the countries that used globalisation to take their place in the global 
supply chain and those that took advantage of globalisation and traded in their natural 
resources. The former would be China and India and the latter would be South Africa, 
Brazil and Russia (Bremmer, 2017).The fall in commodity prices over recent years have 
done damage to the GDP growth in the South African, Brazilian and Russian 
economies. On the contrary, the Chinese economy has catapulted itself into its current 
position of second largest economy in the world in terms of nominal GDP and India has 
recently been ranked 6th in the world in terms of the 2017 World Bank figures (Kaul, 
2018).Of the five countries making up the BRICS bloc the two countries with the most 
similarities in terms of history and economies would be South Africa and Brazil, as the 
countries share a similar history of colonisation, political activism, poverty and rich 
cultural diversity.  
Brazil’s dominant industries 
In Brazil the largest portion of the GDP and employment can be attributed to the 
services industry. This sector is made up of organisations in the  hospitality, finance, 
retail and professional services. 
In Brazil the second largest contribution to the GDP comes from the manufacturing 
sector. This sector has  flourished due to its diversified nature. A multitude of products is 
manufactured in Brazil ranging from aircrafts and chemicals to food products and 
clothing. 
In Brazil the agricultural industry makes up just 5.6% of GDP, but this industry is quite 
significant as Brazil’s biggest exports are that of commodities. Brazil is the world’s 
leading producer of soya beans, coffee, cocoa and sugar and it can also boast as one  
of the few countries  in the world that is self-sufficient in oil (Pajbai, 2018). 
South Africa’s dominant industries: 
South Africa’s economic history was also deeply rooted in the primary sector with an 
abundance of natural resources and agricultural conditions. 
However, over the last 20 years there has been a shift to more of a tertiary sector 
economy with industries such as wholesale and retail trade, tourism and 
communications taking becoming more of the driving force of the economy. South Africa 
is striving to become a knowledge based economy with the focus shifting to e-
commerce, financial and other services (Tech, 2018).  
The current contributors to the GDP and the sectors that are keeping the economic 




main exports like Brazil are also commodities which include corn, diamonds, fruits, gold, 
metals and minerals, sugar, and wool (Tech, 2018).  
“South Africa is the world's largest producer of chrome, manganese, platinum, vanadium 
and vermiculite, the second largest producer of ilmenite, palladium, rutile and zirconium. 
It is also the world's third largest coal exporter and the second largest producer of gold 
(Wikipedia, 2018). “ 
The 10th annual BRIC summit was held in Johannesburg in July of 2018 and 
unfortunately the Brazilian and South African economies share in a similar bleak current 
situation. Brazil’s political situation is currently in a tumultuous state, with fierce political 
divisions, corruption and an unemployment rate of 12.6%. This coupled with the fall in 
raw material prices and dwindling investor confidence has shaken the Brazilian 
economy (Willy, 2018). South Africa finds itself in a similar and sometime worse 
situation. Like Brazil the political state of affairs is tumultuous, the level of poverty and 
inequality is high and the unemployment rate is double that of Brazil at 27%. Like Brazil 
the economy has shown slow growth in the last two years (Willy, 2018). 
 
4.8 Chapter summary 
After a review of the predetermined margins for transfer pricing as implemented in 
Brazil, it would be reasonable to conclude that this approach in itself would not be a 
very prudent choice to make when looking at alternatives or supplementary methods for 
transfer pricing in the South African environment. Brazil had applied to the OECD for 
membership status and this indicates that the leadership was clearly willing to negotiate 
and potentially compromise on some of its transfer pricing policies. Some aspects of the 
Brazilian transfer pricing law are contrary to the OECD principles, which in turn could 
have a very negative impact on the investment potential of South Africa to the rest of 
the world (PWC, 2014). That being said it must be recognised that the Brazilian method 
has a number of advantages for a developing country, like South Africa such as: 
 Using pre-determined margins eliminates the use of broad, general, tax rules, 
with the aim of reducing avenues for taxpayer abuse. 
  It provides Brazil’s tax regulators with objective criteria to more easily review and 
implement transfer pricing adjustments. 
 It reduces the number of highly skilled tax administrators that would be required 





After a review of the Brazilian transfer pricing method it would be reasonable to 
conclude that the method is not without challenge, and like formulary apportionment, will 
not be able to replace the arm’s length method (PWC, 2014). There is however a 
possibility that some of the principles and formulas applied in Brazil could be used as an 
alternate or supplementary method in the absence of comparable information.  
Like formulary apportionment the method of predetermined margins exposes the 
taxpayer to potential double taxation of the same revenue. However, where Double Tax 
Agreements (DTA) exist between two trading parties a Mutual Agreement Procedures 
(MAP) could be written into the articles of the DTA to provide a method of resolving any 
double taxation that could arise and in this manner overcome the potential barrier of 
double taxation  (PWC, 2014). 
South Africa like all developing countries is looking to attract foreign Investment; 
therefore it would be reasonable to assume that the tax authorities would not implement 
international tax practices into its domestic legislation that could hinder this objective. 
However, like formulary apportionment, when incorporated into a country’s domestic 
legislation as an alternative or supplementary approach, when comparable data is not 
available, this method could prove to be a very useful when seeking to determine an 
arm’s length price. By determining the predetermined margins the revenue authorities 
can achieve a level of assurance that the cross border transactions are:  
(a) either in line with prices charged to other parties that the MNE transacts 
with or  
(b) determine that the intercompany charge is distorted and base the tax on the 









CHAPTER 5:  CONCLUSION - A SOLUTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
Over the last few chapters, three transfer pricing concepts namely the arm’s length 
approach, formulary apportionment and the use of predetermined margins were 
discussed and reviewed in relation to the advantages and disadvantages associated 
with each one of these concepts. This was done with the overarching intention of 
determining if it could be an alternative or supplementary method in instances where 
comparable information is not available to determine a fair transfer price for MNE cross- 
border transactions in South Africa. The intention is  therefore not to replace the arm’s 
length principle, rather to provide complementary alternatives when comparable data is 
not available. The current transfer pricing framework used in South Africa is the arm’s 
length pricing method as recommended by the OECD and the UN Model Tax 
Conventions. The underlying driver for arm’s length pricing is that each transaction 
should be evaluated based on the economic circumstances that are relevant for that 
specific transaction at hand. However, arm’s length pricing is subject to notable and 
undeniable theoretical shortcomings as well as difficulties in day-to-day application as 
previously discussed. 
 
In earlier chapters, it was noted that the arm’s length approach appears to be the 
natural choice for most countries, based on the fact that it receives such wide 
acceptance and support from all over the world. The OECD affected some reforms to 
the transfer pricing model which stemmed from the work done during the BEPS project, 
which concluded in 2015. Cumulatively, the reforms introduced by the OECD amount to 
changes to the current arm’s length pricing based system without necessarily changing 
the underlying problem which is the application of an arm’s length price through the use 
of comparable information. The Davis Tax Committee recommended that South Africa 
incorporate the changes brought about by the BEPS project as recommended by the 
OECD into the fiscal policy of South Africa.  
Having discussed the formulary apportionment method in an earlier chapter of this 
dissertation it became quite evident, in that chapter, that the formulary model itself will 
certainly create an environment that will eliminate the opportunity for MNE’s to engage 
in profit shifting, but not without challenges. A significant disadvantage and criticism of 
the system is the real possibility of double taxation of MNE’s in certain instances and 




acceptable to all parties involved (Cockfield, 2004). That being said the Mutual 
Agreement Procedures (MAP) can be used to address the situation where an instance 
of double taxation should arise. As mentioned earlier MAP is a globally used dispute 
resolution process where the tax authorities of the two jurisdictions negotiate and agree 
to terms that would overcome the issue of double taxation.   
South Africa is a developing country and its economy is comprised of a number of 
sectors. International investment into the economy and these sectors is a key 
requirement for the growth and continued development of the country’s economy. With 
this in mind, it would appear to be a step in the wrong direction to implement a system 
such as formulary apportionment, even on a supplementary basis that would certainly 
create caution and limit the number of MNE’s looking to invest in the South African 
economy. Implementing formulary apportionment, for transfer pricing would bring 
certainty to the revenue collections, but the certainty of collections becomes a moot 
point if this certainty comes at the cost of potential disinvestment by MNE’s in South 
Africa or the reduction of future investment. The challenge of profit shifting from South 
Africa by MNE’s is a very concerning matter, but not one that would be resolved by a 
formulary system in any capacity. A formulary system could potentially lead to even 
more problems for South Africa and similar countries, who could find it negotiating 
formulas with other tax authorities that could still lead to loss of tax base in an attempt to 
remain competitive. This could lead to even more distortion in terms of how it relates to 
the value created for an item or product in a specific jurisdiction. (Ogutta, 2011) 
The third system addressed in this document was the predetermined margins as used 
in Brazil. This system eliminates the use of broad, general, tax rules, with the aim of 
reducing avenues for taxpayer abuse. It provides Brazil’s tax regulators with objective 
criteria to more easily review and implement transfer pricing adjustments. The system 
itself is also geared towards commodities. Like South Africa, the export of commodities 
in Brazil still has a significant impact on the economy of the country. Some aspects of 
the Brazilian transfer pricing law are clearly contrary to the OECD principles but at the 
same time the Brazilian method has a number of strengths as discussed in Chapter 4.  
These strengths could be of benefit to countries like South Africa, who have been 
subjected to financial losses to Treasury by following the traditional OECD 





South Africa and Brazil’s economic profile have many similarities, which is to a large 
extent driven by and a product of the socio-economic and political environment in these 
countries. Brazil has been on the path of economic decline, and South Africa is starting 
to show striking similarities in its own economic journey (Business Tech, 2017).  
 According to Martyn Davies, Managing director of emerging markets and Africa at 
Deloitte, just a few years ago both South Africa and Brazil were considered first-tier 
emerging market economies personified by their inclusion into the BRICS acronym 
(Martyn Davies, 2017). Currently China and India are the only contributors to the BRICS 
bloc, with Russia also struggling on an economic front (Business Tech, 2017).  
Both South Africa and Brazil are on a declining ratings path; both are vulnerable with 
their current account deficits; and both face waning confidence from foreign investors 
(Martyn Davies, 2017). Brazil was named the 2nd most complex jurisdiction when it 
comes to accounting and taxation complexity by TMF Group’s 2017 financial complexity 
Index19 (TMF, 2018). Currently Brazil’s bilateral accords with other countries represent 
just 10 percent of the global GDP (Business Tech, 2017). The foreign investment and 
growth potential in Brazil is far greater than this statistic, but due to the socio-economic 
and political uncertainty, which is then also exacerbated by very rigid tax policies, 
makes Brazil a country that is approached with caution by foreign enterprises looking to 
invest in developing countries. The foreign enterprises that do invest in Brazil have 
accepted that there will be unfavourable tax implications when doing so and are willing 
to accept those costs (OECD, 2018). 
It is rather telling and significant to note that under the rule of then president, Michael 
Temer, Brazil had made application to become a full member of the OECD in 2017.  
This was part of President Temer’s effort to try and strengthen ties with Western 
developed nations. He hoped that OECD membership would help attract foreign 
investment to the Brazilian economy that is still struggling to recover from its worst 
recession to date (Fortune, 2017). Despite their differences with OECD policies 
surrounding transfer pricing, Brazil have always provided the OECD input through work 
groups and provided much input with the recently concluded BEPS project. If the 
application to the OECD is approved, Brazil would be the largest emerging economy in 
the OECD and the third Latin American country to, as well as the first of the BRICS to 
                                                          
19TMF Group is a multinational professional services firm headquartered in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. The 






become an OECD member (Fortune, 2017). It remains to be seen if the new president 
elect of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro will be supportive of the application for OECD 
membership. 
If Brazil were to gain full membership, the tax authorities would be required to start 
accepting the arm’s length standard, or, at least, accept the arm’s length standard when 
required to do so under a treaty MAP provision.20 This could inevitably require Brazil to 
adopt the arm’s length standard in its domestic legislation. This could prove to be 
challenging as it would require the Brazilian tax authorities to deal with the subjectivity 
that the arm’s length approach entails instead of the current approach which provides a 
greater degree of certainty to the Brazilian tax authorities (EY, 2018). Brazil might not 
necessarily be eager or even willing to abandon all of their current tax policies and the 
certainty in collections that their current system affords the treasury.  
With this in mind a potential alternative to accepting the OECD arm’s length approach 
would be for Brazil to maintain its current transfer pricing legislation and use an 
alternative approach when a situation of a double tax treaty situation should arise. An 
alternative approach as recommended in a recent article would be to accept different 
profit margins, if doing so, would result in a transfer price aligned with that which would 
have been reached under the arm’s length standard (EY, 2018). This could potentially 
allow a country like Brazil to enhance relations with more MNE’s and to a large extent 
still maintain their current domestic legislation. 
Throughout this paper, what has become apparent is that neither the formulary 
approach nor the predetermined margins approach is necessarily a solution that is 
definitively better and able to replace  the arm’s length principle. Both approaches have 
shortcomings and weaknesses that would create a different series of challenges. But 
that was not what this paper was seeking to establish. This dissertation seek to 
establish if either one of these methods could be used as an alternative or 
supplementary method where the arm’s length requirements of comparable information 
cannot be fulfilled.  The answer for South Africa and even the greater Southern Africa 
could lie somewhere in the middle of these methods. As a continent, Africa has 
approximately 30 percent of the earth's remaining mineral resources (Al jazeera, 2018). 
                                                          
20
Mutual Agreement Procedure (MAP) is a procedure which allows the Competent Authorities or designated representatives of 
the Competent Authorities from the governments of the Contracting States/Parties to interact with the intent to resolve 
international tax disputes. MAP is provided for in an Article in a Double Taxation Agreement (DTA) and can involve matters 
containing juridical double taxation cases, as well as inconsistencies in the interpretation or application of a DTA. Action plan 14 
of the BEPS report   contains a commitment by countries to implement a minimum standard to ensure that treaty related 




Sub-Saharan Africa has six of the world's 10 fastest-growing economies. Yet as a 
continent, the people of Africa remain poor and the economies fail to grow. Given that 
developing countries, like Africa, rely heavily on corporate income tax, in particular from 
multinational enterprises, curtailing tax avoidance is of significant importance. If African 
countries do not limit corporate tax avoidance, the losses of potential tax revenue that 
could be used for development will continue to rise and the high levels of poverty and 
unemployment will not be able to be addressed. (Durst, 2014) 
The only African country that is part of the Group of 20 countries and one of the base 
erosion and profit shifting associate countries was South Africa. In the development of 
the Base Erosion project, the OECD indicated that it would take into account the 
perspectives of developing countries. This did not happen  when the base erosion and 
profit shifting agenda was developed. The process was therefore heavily criticized for 
the lack of focus it showed when considering the needs of developing countries. ( 
United Nations Economics Commission for Africa, 2018). 
So maybe it is time that Africa looks inward for a solution to this problem. As a start it 
could be proposed that the SADC countries21 should try to address intercompany 
transfer pricing challenge as a collective. “The main objectives of Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) is to achieve economic development, peace and security, 
growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern 
Africa, and support the socially disadvantaged through Regional Integration (SADC, 2018).” 
Through the available and existing mechanisms, the countries could formulate transfer 
pricing policy into their domestic tax legislation that allows for a hybrid system for 
cross- border transactions in goods that handles all intercompany transfer transactions 
with multinationals in a specific manner where comparable data is not available.  
This would create a system that still complies with the OECD recommendations and 
the requirements of Article 9(2). This potential system could allow for the use of 
predetermined margins as an alternative or supplementary method where value drivers 
are not necessarily reflected in the transfer price. This could be due to the inherent 
complexity of the transaction or the lack of comparable data on which to base its 
reasonableness. It will represent a system that is not seen as hostile and can be 
regarded as investor friendly to international organisations. It will still comply with the 
international standards while also allowing the South African tax authorities and the tax 
                                                          
21
 SADC countries: The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is a Regional Economic Community 
comprising 16 Member States; Angola, Botswana, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eswatini, Lesotho, 




authorities of the other countries in the SADC the right to funds that is more reflective 
of the functions performed in these countries by MNE’s, to derive the income. 
So, to conclude, individually all three of these methods discussed have shortcomings. 
From a South African perspective, there would be great benefit derived from 
incorporating predetermined margins on the trade of goods into the domestic tax 
legislation as a method to establish an arm’s length price. This method could be  
available where comparable data cannot be determined due to the uniqueness or 
complexity of a particular cross border transaction within an MNE. The tax authorities 
could potentially rank the methods and list this approach as a method of last resort not 
first choice. In this way tax authorities can still provide a measure of assurance to 
MNE’s that incorporating the method into the domestic tax laws is not with the intention 
of overtaxing, but merely the provision of an alternative or supplementary method that 
can be used when an arm’s length price cannot be convincingly obtained in any other 
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